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I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling the worldwide tobacco epidemic is an extraordinary public
health challenge. It is beyond scientific dispute that the use of tobacco has
devastating health consequences for the user and for those exposed to
environmental tobacco smoke. The exceptional public health implications of
tobacco consumption, long apparent in industrialized states, are now apparent
worldwide. Today, smoking is responsible for three million premature deaths
per year,' and the annual rate of mortality from tobacco is projected to spiral
to twelve million per year by the middle of the next century, with most of the
increase in deaths occurring in developing countries .2 The vast size and rapid
spread of this epidemic make tobacco consumption a uniquely important
public health crisis calling for national and international action.
Domestic tobacco control legislation has proven to be essential to tobacco
control, yet only a limited number of countries have adopted effective
regulatory measures.' Most industrialized states have implemented restrictive
legislation, which may include banning tobacco advertising and promotion,
substantially raising taxes and prices on tobacco products, and expanding
restrictions on smoking in public places. Tobacco consumption has decreased
or stagnated in those societies. In response, the tobacco industry has
increasingly focused on penetrating and creating markets throughout Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, where tobacco regulation is weak
or nonexistent.
Despite growing public awareness of the global problems caused by
tobacco and of the critical role of national legislation in reducing tobacco
consumption and production, scholars have paid little attention to the role that
international organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO),
can play in encouraging and assisting national legislation efforts. WHO is the
primary multilateral organization charged with addressing the global health
implications of tobacco. WHO has promoted national tobacco control
legislation for over twenty-five years through its Tobacco or Health
Programme, yet the organization has been unable to convince most states to
adopt and effectively implement restrictive tobacco control legislation.
Recognizing the need to increase international efforts to promote national
tobacco regulation, WHO is now considering, for the first time, the role that
international legislation can play in furthering its Tobacco or Health
Programme. In May 1995, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the legislative
organ of WHO,4 in resolution WHA48. 11, requested the Director-General of
WHO to report on the "feasibility of developing an international instrument
1. Cori Vanchieri, WHO Trying to Slow Tobacco Related Deaths in Developing Countries, 84 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1689, 1689 (1992) (quoting Alan D. Lopez).
2. Kenneth E. Warner, Tobacco Taxation as Health Policy in the Third World, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 529, 529 (1990).
3. For an excellent discussion of the essential role of national legislation in achieving worldwide
tobacco control, see generally RUTH ROEMER, LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO COMBAT THE WORLD TOBACCO
EPIDEMIC (2d ed. 1993).
4. The World Health Assembly is the legislative organ of WHO and determines overall policy. WHO
CONST. art. 18, in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS 1, 6 (40th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS]. See infra note 144 for a discussion of WHO's administrative structure,
A Strategy for Global -Tobacco Control
such as guidelines, a declaration, or an International Convention on Tobacco
Control. "s
This Article argues for an international regulatory approach that WHO
can utilize to encourage international agreement and action on tobacco control.
A review of the factors that constrain states from implementing effective
tobacco control legislation vividly demonstrates that this global health
challenge is international in origin, necessitating collaborative, multilateral
action. WHO can further national codification and implementation of tobacco
legislation by stimulating the development of international tobacco agreements
and supportive international supervisory and financial institutions.
In light of the political factors limiting global tobacco control efforts,
WHO should adopt a dynamic and incremental approach to international
standard setting patterned on the international legislative techniques developed
by other international organizations in a number of areas, including human
rights and environmental protection. Instead of encouraging states to enact a
single international instrument, as WHA48.11 suggests, WHO should
gradually develop political consensus for national and international action on
tobacco control, first promoting the adoption of a noncontroversial, nonlegal
international instrument, and then encouraging the development of binding
international agreements with sophisticated provisions for implementation and
international review. By providing an ongoing diplomatic forum, WHO may,
over time, heighten governmental concern about the global dangers of tobacco
and may eventually transform that concern into widespread support for the
adoption of cogent international norms.
An international organization's ability to affect national decisionmaking
is naturally limited by a world order of independent states. Critical economic
interests are at stake in the global tobacco debate. Transnational tobacco
conglomerates, as well as many states, will powerfully resist the codification
of international commitments to regulate tobacco. Notwithstanding these
political constraints, WHO does have a degree of institutional independence
to promote and guide governmental action. Recent revelations of what the
tobacco industry has known and concealed about the addictive and lethal
consequences of nicotine,6 as well as sharpened interest in tobacco regulation
in a number of countries, including the United States, have highlighted the
issue of tobacco control worldwide. These changing global circumstances have
created a unique opportunity for WHO to serve as an effective forum for the
development of an international regulatory strategy, educating and motivating
national leaders to rethink priorities and direct attention to controlling tobacco
through a regulatory framework. The successful experience of other
international organizations, including the United Nations Environmental
Programme and the International Maritime Organization, in stimulating
national and international action in areas fraught with political conflict 7 can
guide WHO's efforts to contain the tobacco pandemic through an international
5. An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 48.11, 48th Ass., 12th plen. mtg.,
Annex 1, Agenda Item 19, WHO Doe. A48/VR/12 (1995).
6. See infra note 19.
7. See discussion infra Part V. Examples include protection of the ozone layer and the Baltic and
North Seas.
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regulatory framework.
WHO, the premier authority on world health matters, has the legal
capacity and public health expertise to catalyze, negotiate, and sponsor
international tobacco control regulations. However, WHO has traditionally
been reluctant to employ legal strategies to advance the organization's health
policies. This Article argues that the time is ripe for WHO to employ
international legal instruments to encourage and assist national tobacco
regulation. The prospect of advancing the global struggle against tobacco
through a legislative framework offers an extraordinary opportunity for WHO
to reaffirm and strengthen its commitment to global public health and enhance
its prestige within the world community.
This Article advocates an international regulatory strategy that WHO can
use to encourage international agreement and action on tobacco control. Part
II describes the tobacco pandemic, the global health implications of tobacco
consumption, and the tobacco industry's penetration of new markets
worldwide. Part I examines the critical role of domestic tobacco regulation
in reducing tobacco prevalence and the absence of effective regulatory
frameworks in most countries. This part also analyzes the international and
national factors that prevent countries from adopting and implementing
effective national tobacco regulation. Part IV analyzes WHO's duty to address
the tobacco pandemic, the successes and limitations of its Tobacco or Health
Programme, and its organizational dynamics. Part V addresses the
contribution that an international regulatory framework and supporting
supervisory and financial institutions can make to WHO's efforts to contain
the tobacco pandemic and identifies a specific international regulatory strategy
that WHO can use to promote international consensus and national action on
tobacco. This Article will show that, through the development of effective
international regulation and supervisory institutions, modeled on the
experiences of other international organizations, WHO can have an important,
albeit limited, effect on the global tobacco epidemic.
II. THE GLOBAL TOBACCO PANDEMIC
A. Tobacco or Health
The scientific evidence that tobacco use is among the largest worldwide
causes of preventable illness and mortality is clearly established. 8 Although
tobacco related disease and death occur in adulthood, tobacco has been
described as a "childhood disease," 9 since most smokers become addicted to
the lethal product during childhood or adolescence.10
Cigarette smoking, the predominant form of tobacco use, is one of the
largest causes of preventable death worldwide and is the leading cause of
8. See infra notes 11, 20.
9. Joseph R. DiFranza & Joe B. Tye, Wo Profits from Tobacco Sales to Children?, 263 JAMA
2784 (1990).
10. Carine Chaix, La Consoymnation Mondiale de Tabac Chez Les Jeunes, 313 LA SANT9 DE
L'HOMME 6, 9-10 (1994).
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premature death in developed countries.' The magnitude of the risk that
cigarettes pose to human health has been widely documented since the U.S.
Surgeon General's 1964 landmark report unequivocally identified smoking as
a health hazard.' 2 Cigarette smoking has been scientifically linked to cancer,
heart disease, and pulmonary disease, among other things. 3 Smokeless
tobacco, including tobacco that is sniffed or chewed, has also proven to be a
threat to human health.14
Smoking causes untimely death and disability not only in the user, but
also in those exposed to environmental tobacco smoke. 5 Nonsmokers who
undergo sustained exposure to environmental tobacco smoke suffer adverse
health effects; for example, they have a significantly higher rate of lung
cancer 16 and heart disease 7 than do those relatively unexposed to tobacco
smoke.
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence, the tobacco industry has long
disputed the addictive effects and health consequences of nicotine and other
11. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, FACTS AND FIGURES: WORLD No-TOBACCO DAY 1 (1994)
(information on May 31, 1994). See generally RICHARD PETO ET AL., MORTALITY FROM SMOKING IN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1950-2000 (1994).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964). Periodic
reports of the U.S. Surgeon General have documented the health risks of tobacco. E.g., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (1979); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING
FOR WOMEN (1980).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERv., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8
(1989). The World Health Organization estimates that in populations in which smoking is widesprdad,
tobacco smoking is responsible for 90-95% of lung cancers, 80-85% of cases of chronic bronchitis, and
20-25% of deaths from heart disease. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 1. In the United
States, cigarettes are responsible for 87% of all lung cancer deaths and 30% of all cancer deaths.
AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES-1994, at 19 (1994).
14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKELESS TOBACCO. A REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. SURGEON GENERAL
(1986); Deborah M. Winn, Smokeless Tobacco and Cancer: The Epidemiologic Evidence, in AMERICAN
CANCER SOC'Y, HEALTH EFFECTS OF SMOKELESS TOBACCO 13, 13-20 (1988). Smokeless tobacco users
are several times more likely to develop cancer than are nonsmokers. Winn, supra, at 19.
15. See generally NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS: THE
REPORT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 6 (1992); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING
(1986) (stating environmental tobacco smoke is linked to lung cancer and respiratory ailments). Children
with sustained exposure to environmental tobacco smoke are at an increased risk for a variety of medical
disorders, including upper respiratory tract infections, bronchitis, pneumonia, allergic reactions, and
impairment of pulmonary function. See, e.g., Committee on Substance Abuse, Tobacco-Free Environment:
An hnperative for the Health of Children and Adolescents, 93 PEDIATRICS 866, 866 (1994); Lung Cancer
Risk Doubles Among Non-smokers Exposed to Tobacco Smoke During Childhood and Adolescence, 33
BLUE SHEET 14 (Sept. 12, 1990).
16. See, e.g., David M. Burns, Environmental Tobacco Smoke: The Price of Scientific Certainty,
84 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1387, 1387 (1992); Elizabeth T.H. Fontham et al., Environmental Tobacco
Smoke and Lung Cancer in Nonsmoking Women, 271 JAMA 1752, 1752-59 (1994).
17. Carl E. Bartecchi et al., The Global Tobacco Epidemic, ScI. AM., May 1995, at 44, 49 (noting
in United States, of estimated 53,000 annual deaths from passive smoking, approximately 37,000 are
caused by smoking related heart disease).
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cigarette ingredients.'" Recently revealed internal corporate documents show,
however, that the tobacco industry has long known that nicotine is addictive
and that cigarette smoking causes disease.19
The size of the tobacco pandemic is daunting. Smoking will have been
responsible for an estimated 60 million premature deaths in developed states
between 1950 and 2000, 37.8 million of the victims being between the ages
of thirty-five and sixty-nine.2" Although most of those killed by tobacco so
far have been in industrialized states, the pandemic of tobacco consumption
and its lethal consequences have spread rapidly in the last several decades to
developing countries.
B. Trends in Global Tobacco Consumption and Production
In the last several decades, industrialized states have mounted aggressive
public health campaigns, including tobacco control legislation, that have
contributed to a dramatic decline in tobacco consumption in their
populations.2 ' With domestic cigarette sales stagnating, the transnational
tobacco industry has successfully focused on developing and expanding new
markets in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former
Soviet Union' where tobacco regulation is limited.
The size and power of the tobacco industry is daunting. It is dominated
by six giant American and British transnational corporations,' particularly
British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, American Brands,
18. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Warner, Tobacco Industry Scientific Advisors: Serving Society or Selling
Cigarettes?, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 839, 839 (1991). In what an industry official has characterized as
a "brilliantly conceived and executed" strategy, the tobacco industry has endeavored to "creat[e] doubt
about the health charge without actually denying it." Id.; see also Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Convenes Grand
Jury to Look at Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at Al.
19. Internal industry documents of Brown and Williamson and its parent company, British American
Tobacco Industries, reveal that corporate officials have known of the addictive effect of nicotine for over
thirty years through their own research studies. John Slade et al., Nicotine and Addiction: The Brown and
Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 225, 225 (1995). Similar evidence has been obtained against Philip
Morris and R.J. Reynolds. Hilts, supra note 18, at A15. In July 1995, for the first time, the U.S. Justice
Department convened a grand jury to investigate whether tobacco companies misrepresented the content
and effects of nicotine to federal regulators. Id. at Al.
20. PETo ET AL., supra note 11, at A8. Directly or indirectly, tobacco products cause about 20%
of all deaths in industrialized countries. World Health Org., Tobacco: The Twentieth Century's Epidemic,
in TOBACCO ALERT, WORLD No-TOBACCO DAY 1995 SPECIAL ISSUE 4, 4 [hereinafter World No-Tobacco
Day 19951.
21. John P. Pierce, Progress and Problems in International Public Health Efforts to Reduce Tobacco
Usage, 12 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 383, 393-97 (1991).
22. Philip L. Shepherd, Transnational Corporations and the International Cigarette Industry, in
PROFITS, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: CASE STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA
63, 79-84 (R.S. Newfarmer ed., 1985).
23. See generally Frederick F. Clairmonte, World Tobacco: A Study in Conglomerate Structures, 14
J. WORLD TRADE L. 23 (1980); Kenyon R. Stebbins, Tobacco or Health in the 77Tird World: A Political
Economy Perspective with Emphasis on Mexico, 17 INT'L L.J. HEALTH SERVICES 521, 524-27 (1987)
[hereinafter Stebbins, Tobacco or Health]; Kenyon R. Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics and Economics:
Implications for Global Health, 33 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1317, 1319-21 (1991) [hereinafter Stebbins,
Tobacco, Politics, and Economics]; PETER R. TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND
MULTINATIONAL POLITICS (1984).
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Rothmans, and Imperial Brands.24 These entities control eighty-five percent
of all tobacco leaf sold on the world market' and are among the largest
private enterprises in the world. Philip Morris, the largest tobacco company
in the United States, is the largest taxpayer in America,26 paying $12.9
billion in excise and income taxes in 1993.27
Confronted with stagnating sales in industrialized states, the tobacco
industry began in the mid-1960s to use political pressure, financial tactics, and
aggressive advertising campaigns to penetrate the markets of developing
countries.2" At the time, many countries operated closed cigarette markets
and restricted sales of cigarettes to those produced by national firms.29 Many
states also used protective trade measures, including import bans, high tariffs,
and import quotas, 30 to shield their national monopolies from competition
and their populations from exposure to foreign tobacco.
Transnational tobacco corporations have sought and secured the help of
their home governments in opening the closed tobacco markets of developing
countries. Western governments have supported global tobacco exports by
subsidizing domestic production of tobacco. The European Union heavily
subsidizes tobacco products pursuant to its Common Agricultural Policy,3
promoting the sale of tobacco at "giveaway prices" in Northern Africa and
24. Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and American Brands are U.S. corporations. British American
Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco are based in the United Kingdom, and Rothmans is located in the United
Kingdom and South America. Gregory N. Connolly, Worldwide Expansion of Transnational Tobacco
Industry, 12 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 29, 30 (1992).
25. Id. at 30. These companies and their subsidiaries produce about 40% of the world's cigarettes.
If the cigarettes manufactured by state tobacco monopolies and centrally planned economies are excluded
from this calculation, these companies produce about 85% of the world's cigarettes. Id. Many national
tobacco monopolies produce tobacco only for domestic consumption. See Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics, and
Economics, supra note 23, at 1319. According to the Panos Institute, "[olver 80% of tobacco production
in the South is for domestic consumption." PANOS INST., TOBACCO: THE SMOKE BLOWS SOUTH, PANOS
MEDIA BRIEFING No. 13, at 2 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter PANos BRIEFING]. China is the world's largest
producer of tobacco and uses the vast majority of the tobacco it grows to satisfy domestic demand.
Tobacco, Politics, and Economics, supra note 23, at 1320. Other major national monopolies include Japan,
Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Latin America's market was "initially composed of monopolies
and national firms," while the state firms of sub-Saharan Africa are quite small, producing one percent
of the world's cigarettes. Connolly, supra note 24, at 31.
26. Roger Rosenblatt, How Do Tobacco Executives Live with Themselves?, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20,
1994 (Magazine), at 34, 36 (describing financial and political power of U.S. tobacco conglomerates).
27. Linda Himelstein et al., Tobacco: Does It Have a Future, BUS. WK., July 4, 1994, at 24, 29.
In the same year, R.J. Reynolds paid a total of $3.9 billion in federal excise and income taxes. Id.
Diversification of the major American tobacco corporations in the 1980s increased the size and power of
these conglomerates. Stebbins, Tobacco or Health, supra note 23, at 525-26. Philip Morris is the largest
consumer products company in the world. Rosenblatt, supra note 26, at 36. The British tobacco companies
are similarly diversified. B.A.T. Industries is not only a tobacco conglomerate, but also an insurance giant.
John Tanner, North-South: British Firm's Surge in Third World Tobacco Profits, Inter Press Service, Mar.
11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
28. Kenyon R. Stebbins, Transnational Tobacco Companies and Health In Underdeveloped
Countries: Recotmnendations for Avoiding a Smoking Epidemic, 30 Soc. SCi. & MED. 227, 228 (1990)
[hereinafter Stebbins, Transnational Tobacco Companies].
29. Connolly, supra note 24, at 31.
30. Id.
31. EUROPEAN BUREAU FOR ACTION ON SMOKING PREVENTION, TOBACCO AND HEALTH IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 8-9 (1994) [hereinafter TOBACCO AND HEALTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION].
264 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 257
Eastern Europe.32
The assistance of the U.S. government has been the most significant
western governmental factor leading to expanded tobacco sales in developing
countries. American based transnational tobacco conglomerates have enlisted
the United States Trade Representative and members of the United States
Congress to overcome foreign trade barriers in developing states.33 Cigarette
exports have been one of the few bright spots in the U.S. trade picture,
shaving the trade deficit by $23.5 billion over the last five years.34 Between
1986 and 1990, by threatening retaliatory trade sanctions under section 301
of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act,35 the Reagan and Bush administrations and
members of the U.S. Congress3 6 successfully pressured Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea to open their closed markets to American cigarettes." 7 When
Thailand resisted, the United States took the matter to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which ruled that Thailand must open its market
to American cigarettes. 3' Although there has been some shift in tobacco trade
policy under the Clinton administration, 9 the U.S. government still supports
the U.S. tobacco companies' efforts to export tobacco products.4"
32. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 73. Tobacco production is also subsidized in other countries, including
Australia and the United States. Id. at 72-73. In addition, for nearly 25 years, the U.S. government helped
tobacco exports in the "Food for Peace Program." Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics, and Economics, supra note
23, at 1320.
33. See infra note 36.
34. Council on Scientific Affairs, The Worldwide Smoking Epidemic: Tobacco Trade, Use, and
Control, 263 JAMA 3312, 3312 (1990) [hereinafter Council Report]; Myron Levin, Targeting Foreign
Smokers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al, A15.
35. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
36. See, e.g., Judith Mackay, U.S. Tobacco Export to the Third World: Third World War, 12 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 25, 26 (1992) (describing efforts of Senator Jesse Helms to further
interests of American tobacco industry in Japan). One American tobacco corporation enlisted the support
of 147 members of Congress to urge the U.S. Trade Representative to use trade sanctions against Hong
Kong, Ireland, Australia, and the United Kingdom if they did not remove their bans on smokeless tobacco
products. Connolly, supra note 24, at 32.
37. See, e.g., William Beaver, The Marlboro Man Rides into the Eastern Bloc, 88 Bus. & Soc'Y
REV. 19, 20 (1994); Andrea J. Hagerman, U.S. Tobacco Exports: The Dichotomy Between Trade and
Health Policies, 1 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 175, 184-88 (1992); Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy
and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a Response from the United States Government, 25
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1991); Fred H. Jones, U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad: Section 301 of the
1974 TradeActas a Tool for Achieving Access to Foreign Tobacco Markets, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 439, 450-53 (1989); Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics, and Economics, supra note 23, at 1321-22; David
Holley, New "Opium War" Cuts Across the Third World, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1990, at HI.
38. Thailand-Restriction on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Panel Report,
Nov. 7, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1122, 1122-40 (1991); see ROEMER, supra note 3, at 76-78. Although the GATT
panel ruled that Thailand must allow cigarette imports, GATT delineated policies Thailand could adopt
that would apply to both domestic and imported tobacco and be consistent with GATT obligations. These
national measures included ad valorem taxes, advertising bans, price restrictions, ingredient disclosures,
strong warning labels, and a ban on brand name and imagery. 30 1.L.M. at 1122-40. The United States
Trade Representative has threatened to refer other states to GATT for alleged discriminatory treatment of
U.S. tobacco imports. GATr Dispute Settlement Panel Report: Japanese Restraints on Imports of
Manufactured Tobacco from the United States, June 11, 1981, available in 1993 BDIEL AD LEXIS 39.
39. Kate Nagy, Farming Tobacco Overseas: International Trade of U.S. Tobacco, 86 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 417 (1994).
40. See, e.g., U.S. Trade and Health Goals Called at Odds in Cigarette Exports, 10 INT'L TRADE
REP. 59, 59 (1993) (U.S. Trade Representative follows aggressive tobacco export stance, while U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services supports Asian anti-smoking groups and programs).
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The tobacco industry has also employed financial tactics to enter and
dominate closed tobacco markets in the last several decades, providing cash
hungry governments with lucrative financial incentives such as joint ventures
and licensing agreements. 4' Such devices have been particularly effective in
enabling the tobacco industry to penetrate national monopolies or compete
independently in Eastern Europe and the former states of the Soviet Union,42
where American and European based transnationals have committed more than
$1.5 billion to build or retool cigarette plants throughout the region.43 In
other developing states, the tobacco industry has focused on dominating or
acquiring domestic tobacco enterprises. This has resulted in the "virtual
disappearance" of independent tobacco operations in developing countries.'
Transnational tobacco conglomerates have also made tremendous inroads
into the markets of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe through
aggressive advertising and promotion. While national firms and state
monopolies did little to advertise their products,' transnational tobacco
conglomerates introduced cigarette advertising and promotion on a massive
scale in these states.' Tobacco advertising and promotion campaigns in
developing states target the youth, particularly young women.47 Women in
these countries represent a tantalizing market for the tobacco industry. An
average of only 8 % of women in developing states currently smoke, compared
to 21 % in industrialized countries.4" In most countries, where public
41. Connolly, supra note 24, at 31. Under licensing agreements, local brands are marketed and
manufactured under the auspices of foreign countries. Kenyon R. Stebbins, Making a Killing South of the
Border: Transnational Cigarette Companies in Mexico and Guatemala, 38 Soc. ScI. & MED. 105, 106
(1991). Setting up local factories has enabled tobacco conglomerates to "compete with national production,
to undermine the monopolies and to reinforce market penetration by creating economic dependence on
tobacco." World Health Org., The Tobacco Industry: Strategies and Prospects, in TOBACCO ALERT,
WORLD No-ToBACCo DAY 1994, at 6, 6.
42. Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds have entered into 14 joint ventures with state tobacco
companies. Philip Morris is involved in nine joint ventures in Eastern Europe and is investing $80-$100
million in a new plant in St. Petersburg, Russia. R.J. Reynolds is involved in five joint ventures and owns
three plants outright for a total investment of $300 million since 1992. Wayne Hearn, Emptying the
World's Ash Trays: International Medical Coimnunity May Support Smoking Cessation Policy, 37 AM.
MED. NEWS 19 (1994).
43. Levin, supra note 34, at A15.
44. Stebbins, Transnational Tobacco Companies, supra note 28, at 229.
45. Nagy, supra note 39, at 417.
46. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SPONSORSHIP OF CUITURAL AND SPORTS ACTIVITIES 1-3 (1994);
Connolly, supra note 24, at 33; see also Ronald M. Davis, Slowing the March of the Marlboro Man, 309
BRIT. MED. J. 889 (1994) (describing promotional tactics used by tobacco industry in developing and
newly industrializing states). Transnational conglomerates spend approximately a quarter of a billion
dollars a year giving away free cigarettes throughout the world. Beaver, supra note 37, at 22.
47. See BOBBIE JACOBSON, BEATING THE LADY KILLERS: WOMEN AND SMOKING 32 (1986); WORLD
HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND TOBACCO 2-3 (1992); Alvin Winder et a[., Gender Differences in Smoking
Prevalence in Asia: Implications for Public Health, Paper presented at the 9th World Conference on
Tobacco or Health, Paris, France 3 (Oct. 1994) (on file with author). For discussion of the efforts of the
tobacco industry to nurture a market for cigarettes among young women in Japan, see Miki Tanikawa,
Smoking Lures Women in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at C3.
48. World Health Org., Women Who Smoke Like Men Face the Same Risks as Men, Press Release
WHO/55 (July 17, 1995); see also Mackay, supra note 36, at 25 (citing statistics that only 5% of women
in developing areas smoke and arguing manufacturers actively seek to increase this number). The threat
that tobacco now poses to women's health worldwide was specifically identified at the Fourth World
Conference on Women. REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, Beijing, China, Sept.
4-15, 1995, art. 107(o) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN]. The
conference resolutions stressed the need to create awareness of the impact of the pandemic and to develop
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knowledge of the dangers of cigarette consumption is limited49 and tobacco
control regulation is weak or nonexistent, 0 the marketing efforts of
transnational corporations have been remarkably successful.
The evidence of this success is staggering. Worldwide cigarette
consumption has increased 75 % in the last few decades."1 American cigarette
exports alone have more than trebled in the last ten years.52 In this decade,
tobacco consumption is expected to fall by 17% in developed states and to rise
by 12% in developing countries and Eastern Europe.53 Although there are
wide differences among countries, regional generalizations about increasing
tobacco consumption are possible.
Tobacco exports and sales have dramatically accelerated in Asia since the
mid-1980s, when Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, all with national
tobacco monopolies, responded to pressure from the Reagan and Bush
administrations by opening their markets to American firms. Between 1985
and 1989, exports of American tobacco to the region doubled.5 4 With Japan,
China, and South Korea in the lead, Asia now has the highest total cigarette
consumption in the world. 5 China, where 70% of men aged twenty-five or
older smoke, 6 is currently the transnational tobacco companies' most
coveted target. According to WHO, the Asian cigarette market will grow
by 30% this decade, with most of the increase going to transnational tobacco
conglomerates. 58
regulatory and educational measures to reduce smoking. Id.
49. In the Philippines, for example, where nearly two-thirds of the men and one-fifth of the women
smoke, a survey by the British journal Tobacco Control found that 57% of the respondents did not know
that cigarettes cause cancer. Levin, supra note 34, at A15. Health warnings on cigarette packages are often
not required; even where required, they are frequently ineffective because of widespread illiteracy.
Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics, and Economics, supra note 23, at 529. In addition, many consumers in
developing states purchase their cigarettes from vendors one at a time and never see a health warning on
a package. Id. The United States does not require that cigarettes for export carry health warnings or a
statement of tar and nicotine. Council Report, supra note 34, at 3318.
50. See infra Part III.A.
51. Council Report, supra note 34, at 3312-13.
52. According to one study, cigarette exports have jumped from 67.1 billion cigarettes in 1984 to
an estimated 207.5 billion cigarettes in 1994. Levin, supra note 34, at Al. As a result of the phenomenal
growth in exports, U.S. tobacco manufacturers actually increased production of cigarettes, despite
declining sales at home. Stebbins, Tobacco or Health, supra note 23, at 52.
53. Davis, supra note 46, at 889.
54. Beaver, supra note 37, at 20.
55. Robert Evans, Third World, Women Boost Smoking Death Forecasts, Reuters BC Cycle, May
30, 1994. In the Western Pacific Region, surveys by WHO indicate that more than 60% of men smoke
in Cambodia, South Korea, Fiji, Kiribati, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. World Health
Org., Tobacco or Health Situation in the Western Pacific Region, in TOBACCO ALERT, Apr. 1993, 2, 2.
In WHO's Southeast Asia Region, which includes India, Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Nepal,
manufactured cigarette consumption is estimated to have increased by 60% between 1963 and 1990. World
Health Org., Tobacco or Health in South-East Asia, in TOBACCO ALERT, Jan. 1993, at 8, 8.
56. Sally Wagern & Rose Mary Romano, Tobacco and the Developing World: An Old Threat Poses
Even Bigger Problems, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1752 (1994). On the activities of foreign tobacco firms
and the predicted health consequences of the smoking epidemic in China, see Jing Je Yu et al., A
Comparison of Smoking Patterns in the People's Republic of China with the United States: An Impending
Health Catastrophe in the Middle Kingdom, 264 JAMA 1575 (1990).
57. See, e.g., Judith Mackay, Battlefieldfor the Tobacco War, 261 JAMA 28 (1990). There are 300
million smokers in China, more people than the entire population of the United States. Philip Shenon,
Asia's Having One Huge Nicotine Fit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994, sec. 4, at 1.
58. Shenon, supra note 57, sec. 4, at 1.
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In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the transnational
conglomerates moved in swiftly after the collapse of communism and
successfully developed a market for "western" brands. 9 Although American
cigarettes have been available in Eastern Europe for many years, the fall of
communism has provided profitable opportunities to acquire state-run plants,
to build new manufacturing facilities, and to advertise tobacco, a practice that
was severely restricted under old socialist regimes." Although there are large
differences across the region, smoking prevalence is high and growing
throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union." In Russia,
approximately 50% of the men and 25% of the women now smoke.62
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the tobacco industry is now
dominated by transnational tobacco conglomerates. 3 A 1992 report by the
U.S. Surgeon General found that the median smoking prevalence in Latin
America and the Caribbean is 37% for men and 20% for women.
Although tobacco consumption is still comparatively low in Africa," it
is growing steadily and rapidly. 5 The Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) predicts that, with projected demographic and socioeconomic changes,
the level of tobacco consumption in Africa will become one of the highest in
the world unless national policies are introduced to counter the trend.66
The enormous growth in smoking throughout the world in recent years
has increased the global risk of tobacco related diseases at an alarming rate.
In Asia and Latin America, the number of people smoking is now growing
7% faster than the general population; in Africa, the figure is 18%.67 The
59. According to the former Director of the Office on Smoking and Health, "[w]hen the Berlin Wall
fell, the multinational tobacco corporations were among the first to rush in and exploit the new Eastern
European markets. . . ." Nagy, supra note 39, at 417; see also Jane Perlez, R.J. Reynolds Woos Polish
Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at DI (stating tobacco conglomerates have purchased plants in
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Russia).
60. Beaver, supra note 37, at 21.
61. See generally Tom Reynolds, Smoking Deaths Soar in Central and Eastern Europe, 87 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 1348 (1995). According to David Simpson of the International Agency on Tobacco and
Health, "[c]igarette companies are going into countries that are very vulnerable to their infiltration ....
Smoking prevalence is very high. Unlike, say, an African country, where tobacco companies have to
introduce the habit in order to create a market, to say the post-Communist market was ready and waiting
for them is an understatement." Id. at 2348; see also World Health Org., Tobacco or Health in Six
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Reports of WHO Tobacco or Health Missions, in TOBACCO
ALERT, July 1993, at 9, 9-10.
62. Heam, supra note 42, at 19. Throughout the region, tobacco conglomerates have nurtured a
budding market of female smokers. WHO reports that in Eastern Europe smoking has increased among
women aged 25 to 34 from 6% to over 15%. Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Health - Women: Western Tobacco
Advertising Blitz Hits East Europe, Inter Press Service, Feb. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Inpres File.
63. World Health Org., Tobacco or Health: Status in the Americas, World Health Organization, in
TOBACCO ALERT, July 1992, at 4, 4.
64. World Health Org., Tobacco Use in Africa and Future Health Consequences, in TOBACCO
ALERT, Apr. 1994, at 2, 2.
65. Derek Yach, The Impact of Smoking in Developing Countries with Special Reference to Africa,
16 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 279, 283-86 (1986).
66. Derek Yach, Tobacco in Africa, WORLD HEALTH F., Jan. 1996, at 1, 4.
67. Reported by the head of WHO's Tobacco or Health program. Simon Chapman, Fiddling While
Tobacco Burns: Sixth World Conference on Smoking and Health, Tokyo, 9-12 November 1987, 296 BRIT.
MED. J. 39, 39-40 (1988). Urbanization and economic growth are associated with increased tobacco use,
contributing to an epidemiological transition. The major causes of death are shifting from communicable
and infectious diseases to chronic diseases more typical of industrialized states. See, e.g., Dean T. Jamison
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already high prevalence of smoking in developing countries is likely to rise
further as economic development makes tobacco more affordable.68 WHO
predicts that if the current trend in developing countries persists over the next
thirty years, seven million inhabitants of developing countries will die
annually from smoking related diseases, 69 accounting for 70% of tobacco
related deaths worldwide.7" Hence, within the next thirty years, smoking will
be not only the leading cause of premature mortality in developed states, but
also the leading cause of premature death worldwide.7"
III. NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO COMBAT TOBACCO: THE
INTERDEPENDENCE OF GLOBAL TOBACCO CONTROL EFFORTS
A. The Role of Legislation in National Tobacco Control Efforts
Domestic regulation has proven to be an essential mechanism of tobacco
control.72 Few countries, however, have managed to adopt comprehensive
regulatory approaches to tobacco control. A review of the history of tobacco
control in countries that have effectively reduced tobacco exposure in their
populations shows that there are a number of broad regulatory strategies that
countries worldwide can use to reduce tobacco prevalence, despite divergent
cultural, social, economic, and health conditions.73 This section reviews the
role of legislation in a comprehensive national antitobacco campaign and
describes specific regulatory strategies that have been and can be adopted by
states to control tobacco prevalence in their societies.
There is considerable evidence that public health regulation can affect
tobacco use. Most industrialized countries have developed a strong regulatory
policy on tobacco that has dramatically reduced tobacco prevalence in these
societies. Canada, for instance, has been among the world leaders in deterring
tobacco consumption74 through a variety of stringent national legislative
measures.7" Western European countries have enacted a variety of measures
& W. Henry Mosley, Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries: Health Policy Response to
Epidemiological Change, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15, 18 (1991).
68. See World No-Tobacco Day 1995, supra note 20, at 5; Jamison & Mosley, supra note 67, at 17-
18.
69. Andrew A. Skolnick, Experts at Buenos Aires Conference Predict Pandemic of Tobacco Deaths,
267 JAMA 3255, 3255 (1992).
70. World Health Org., WorldNo-Tobacco Day 1994: Over One Billion Smokers in the World, WHO
Press Release WHO/44 (May 30, 1944).
71. Skolnick, supra note 69, at 3255.
72. For an excellent and exhaustive study of national tobacco regulation worldwide, see generally
ROEMER, supra note 3.
73. The resolutions of the Fourth World Conference on Women called upon states to adopt tobacco
regulating measures as an important component of health promotion and disease prevention worldwide.
REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, supra note 48, art. 107(o).
74. Between 1981 and 1994, the prevalence of tobacco smoking in Canada declined from 38% to
31%. HEALTH CANADA, SURVEY ON SMOKING IN CANADA 1 (1994) (on file with author); see also
HEALTH CANADA, A GUIDE FOR TRACKING PROGRESS FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO REDUCE TOBACCO USE IN CANADA (1994) (on file with author).
75. By statute, Canadian and provincial taxes on cigarettes are about 76.5% of the total price paid
by consumers - a figure somewhat higher than that in Western European states and much higher than that
in the United States. Robert Kagen & Daniel Vogel, The Politics of Smoking Regulation: Canada, France,
the United States, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 22, 28 (Robert L. Rabin &
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to combat smoking, 76 and the European Economic Community has furthered
cooperation among governments on strong regulatory measures to reduce
tobacco consumption throughout the region.'
Since there are a number of diverse determinants of smoking behavior,78
legislation alone cannot contain the smoking epidemic. However, according
to Professor Ruth Roemer, domestic regulation of tobacco has proven to be
a critical element in national tobacco control efforts for the following reasons:
Legislation can express government policy on the production, promotion and use of tobacco;
emphasize the government's commitment to combating smoking by allocating governmental
resources to effective anti-tobacco programmes; launch governmental and voluntary
antismoking activities; encourage smokers to stop smoking and dissuade potential smokers,
particularly young people, from starting to smoke; protect the right of nonsmokers to be
free from involuntary or passive smoking; and contribute to a climate of opinion and social
pressure in which smoking is unacceptable. 9
There is a consensus within the public health community that the most
effective way to reduce tobacco prevalence is to use as many regulatory
strategies as possible. 0 The next section briefly reviews the global evidence
for the effectiveness of five critical regulatory measures that can be and have
been adopted by states worldwide to reduce tobacco prevalence in their
societies.
1. Fiscal Measures
Perhaps the most important tobacco control measures are domestic fiscal
regulations that discourage both the use and the production of tobacco.8 One
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). In February 1994, the Canadian government launched the Tobacco
Demand Reduction Strategy. The strategy, designed to enhance Canada's tobacco control efforts, is a three
year initiative funded by a health promotion surtax (CAN$60 million annually) on tobacco manufacturing
profits. HEALTH CANADA, TOBACCO DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGY: AN UPDATE 1 (1994) (on file with
author). The Canadian government's regulatory effort to restrict severely tobacco advertising and
promotion, however, was recently ruled unconstitutional by the Canadian Supreme Court. RJR-
MacDonald, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 100 C.C.C.3d 449 (1995).
76. See Marc Danzon & Tapani Piha, Europe and Smoking, in WORLD HEALTH, Nov. 1991, at 18;
see also TOBACCO AND HEALTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 31 (providing country by country
analysis of tobacco control legislation in Europe); Annie J. Sasco et al., International Agency for the
Research on Cancer, Comparative Study of Anti-smoking Legislation in Countries of the European
Economic Community, IARC Technical Report No. 8 (1992) (same).
77. See, e.g., TOBACCO AND HEALTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 31, at 1-10. Directives
of the Council of the European Communities have provided for the harmonization of laws, regulations,
and administrative provisions of member states concerning bans on television advertising, bans on certain
oral tobacco products, the taxation of tobacco products, the tar content of cigarettes, the labeling of
tobacco products, and the restriction of smoking in public places. Id. at 6-7.
78. See, e.g., Chen Minzhang, Smoking in China, 16 WORLD HEALTH F. 10 (1995); Ruth Roemer,
Legislation to Combat the Tobacco Epidemic and the African Countries, Paper Presented at the All Africa
Conference on Tobacco and Health, Harare, Zimbabwe, 4-5 (Nov. 16, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Tobacco Legislation in Africa]. A comprehensive tobacco control program includes restrictive
regulation, "preventive action, public information, education programs, and smoking cessation
interventions." Tobacco Legislation in Africa, supra, at 5.
79. 2 WORLD HEALTH ORG., SMOKE-FREE EUROPE: LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES FOR A SMOKE-FREE
EUROPE, at 1-2 (1987) [hereinafter 2 SMOKE-FREE EUROPE].
80. E.g., Pierce, supra note 21, at 396.
81. See, e.g., Ruth Roemer, Legislation to Control Smoking: Leverage for Effective Policy, 9
CANCER DETECTION & PREVENTION 99, 105 (1986) [hereinafter Roemer, Leverage for Effective Policy].
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type of effective regulation is taxation. Many studies in industrialized states,
as well as the few studies conducted in developing states, have found an
inverse correlation between cigarette prices and consumption, 2 particularly
among the young.83 Other critical economic legislation that countries have
adopted focuses on decreasing the profitability of tobacco production. These
strategies include crop substitution programs and eliminating subsidies for
tobacco production.'M
2. Regulation of Advertising and Promotion
Advertising and promotion are the tobacco industry's most powerful
weapons in its campaign to increase tobacco consumption.8" The goals of
advertising, promotion, and packaging are to increase consumption,
particularly among the young; to encourage smokers to continue smoking; and
to create an atmosphere in which smoking is socially acceptable. 6
Advertising is effective, particularly among children, 7 and the growing
popularity of tobacco use among the youth of developing and newly
industrialized states - where advertising restrictions are scarce - heightens
concern about its use. 88
Advertising regulations are now the world's most common type of
antismoking legislation. 9 Twenty-seven countries now prohibit virtually all
tobacco advertising, and a total of seventy-seven control either its content or
82. Tax increases can apply to all cigarettes equally, or legislators can differentiate by imposing
higher taxes on cigarettes with higher tar and nicotine content. Between 1978 and 1981, the United
Kingdom successfully imposed a cigarette tax on high tar and nicotine cigarettes to reduce consumption.
See, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 3, at 94.
83. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 21, at 394. Although cigarette demand among adult smokers is
fairly price inelastic, young smokers are very responsive to changes in the price of cigarettes. Studies in
the United States have found that a 10% increase in price produces a 14% decrease in tobacco
consumption among teenagers. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 86 (citing Kenneth E. Warner, Cigarette
Taxation:Doing Good by Doing Well, 5 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 312, 312 (1984)). Existing studies suggest
that tobacco consumption in less developed countries may be even more sensitive to price increases than
in developed states. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 88; Warner, supra note 2, at 529.
84. See, e.g., 2 SMOKE-FREE EUROPE, supra note 79, at 21.
85. Tobacco Legislation in Africa, supra note 78, at 6. The sheer size of worldwide tobacco
advertising demonstrates its importance to the tobacco industry. Annually, $4 billion is spent on advertising
and promotion, making tobacco the world's most heavily advertised product. Stebbins, Tobacco orHealth,
supra note 23, at 528.
86. See, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 3, at 24-26; Gilbert J. Botvin et al., Smoking Behavior of
Adolescents Exposed to Cigarette Advertising, 108 PUB. HEALTH REP. 217 (1993).
87. According to the U.S. Center for Disease Control, advertising directly influences brand
awareness and attitudes about smoking among adolescents. Adolescents generally smoke the most heavily
advertised brands. Trends in Smoking Initiation Among Adolescents and Young Adults-United States, 1980-
1989, 274 JAMA 528, 529 (1995). However, a few commentators question the connection between
tobacco advertising and tobacco consumption. See, e.g., Jean J. Boddewyn, Cigarette Advertising Bans
and Smoking: The Flawed Policy Connection, 13 INT'L J. ADVERTISING 331 (1994).
88. For instance, the World Health Organization calls upon states not only to ban direct
advertisement in the printed media, on billboards and television, and through promotion, but also to ban
indirect advertising such as sponsorship of sporting events and the association of tobacco with other
products. See, e.g., Roemer, Leverage for Effective Policy, supra note 81, at 100-03. Forms of indirect
promotion proliferate as the tobacco industry seeks to evade advertising restrictions. See, e.g., 2 SMOKE-
FREE EUROPE, supra note 79, at 6.
89. E.g., ROEMER, supra note 3, at 32-43.
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its timing.9"
The tobacco industry, however, has vehemently and sometimes
successfully attacked such regulations as violations of the industry's freedom
of expression. As commercial speech, tobacco advertising enjoys some
constitutional or statutory protection in a number of countries. 9 In
September 1995, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down the
Canadian Tobacco Products Control Act,92 which banned virtually all
advertisement of tobacco products,9 3 as an unconstitutional infringement of
freedom of expression.94 The Court's decision was widely considered a
stunning setback to global public health forces, since the Tobacco Products
Control Act was regarded as a model for legislation in other countries.95
3. Regulation of Smoking in Public Places and Workplaces
Regulation of smoking in public places and workplaces serves a number
of functions in comprehensive national campaigns to reduce tobacco use.96
First, regulating smoking in these locations protects the rights and health of
nonsmokers.97 Second, such legislation effectively discourages smoking by
90. Id. at 250. See generally Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues: The Global
Perspective, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 309, 341-44 (1994) (comparing different countries' approaches
to advertising regulation). The stringency of tobacco advertising regulation varies among states. The
minimum approach prohibits advertising on television and radio, while more stringent approaches range
from restricting the content and format of advertising in printed media and on billboards to total bans on
advertising. 2 SMOKE-FREE EUROPE, supra note 79, at 3, 6.
91. Alan T. Shao & John S. Hill, Global Television Advertising Restrictions: The Case of Socially
Sensitive Production, 13 INT'L J. ADVERTIsING 347 (1994); Paul Robbennolt, Comment, Not Just Smoke
and Mirrors: Free Expression and EC Restrictions on Tobacco and Alcohol Advertising, 1992 U. Cmu.
LEGAL F. 419, 420, 434. In the European Union, all television tobacco advertising has been banned. Shao
& Hill, supra, at 349. No political consensus has been achieved on a European Commission proposal
calling for a ban on all direct and indirect advertising of tobacco. See Note, Tobacco Proves Addictive:
The European Community's Stalled Proposal to Ban Tobacco Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
149 (1993) [hereinafter Tobacco Proves Addictive]. Some legal authorities in the United States argue that
broad tobacco advertising bans would be consistent with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & Allan M. Brandt, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the
Advertisement of Cigarettes: Balancing Public Health Benefits with Constitutional Burdens, 269 JAMA
904, 905 (1993).
92. Tobacco Products Control Act of June 28, 1988, ch. 20, [19881 1 S.C. 393 (Can.).
93. See, e.g., Kagen & Vogel, supra note 75, at 28-30. In particular, the Act banned all cigarette
advertising and promotion in newspapers and magazines. Id.
94. RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 100 C.C.C.3d 449 (1995). The Court ruled
that limited restrictions on tobacco ads were permissible under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, but that a comprehensive ban on advertising would improperly prohibit tobacco manufacturers
from communicating with consumers about a legal product. Id.
95. See, e.g., Canada Voids All-out Ban on Tobacco Products, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at A6.
96. See, e.g., Roemer, Leverage for Effective Policy, supra note 81, at 106-08. For analysis of
national regulation of smoking in public places and work sites, see, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 3, at 97-
116; R. Masironi & H. Geizerova, World Health Org., Smoke-Free Public Places: A World Overview,
WHO Doc. WHO/TOH/CLH/90.3 (1990); see also Maria Oknoska, Legal Aspects of Passive Smoking:
An Annotated Bibliography, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 445 (1994) (highlighting public concerns and legal strategies
relating to second-hand smoke).
97. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (describing health consequences of environmental
tobacco smoke).
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contributing to an atmosphere in which smoking is socially unacceptable.98
At least ninety states have legislation regulating smoking in public places,
and subnational legislation is also commonplace, although the regulations'
extensiveness varies widely.99 In addition, there has been increased public
support for national regulation of smoking in workplaces in the last decade;
about forty states have legislated such restrictions,' °°  but the
comprehensiveness varies considerably across countries.' 01
4. Discouraging Tobacco Consumption by Young People
Because most smokers start in their teenage years, °2 legislation
addressing the forces that encourage children to use tobacco has proven
critical in national public health campaigns aimed at reducing the morbidity
and mortality associated with tobacco use.'0 3 Some forty-two countries have
enacted such legislation.'"
Tobacco regulation in the United States is weak compared to that in other
industrialized states.' °5 Recent initiatives at the federal level, however,
reflect expanding public support for regulations to discourage young people
from smoking. In August 1995, the Clinton administration proposed a number
of federal measures to reduce the number of American children who become
addicted to nicotine.0 6 The proposed regulations involve measures to reduce
98. According to WHO, "by expressing the social norm of a non-smoking environment, [such
regulation] activates peer pressure and so exercises an influence that exceeds the specific terms of the
legislation." 2 SMoKE-FREE EUROPE, supra note 79, at 25.
99. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 97-100. Smoking is most commonly banned in government buildings,
hospitals and health centers, educational institutions, nurseries, public transportation, and indoor public
places (including theaters, cinemas, libraries, museums, elevators, restaurants, and sports arenas). Id. at
100, 111-12.
100. World Health Org., Tobacco-free Workplaces and the Law, World No-Tobacco Day 1992 Press
Summary (May 31, 1992).
101. In addition, some countries restrict tobacco smoking where it creates an increased risk of
disability or disease, such as where hazardous materials are used or pregnant women work. ROEMER,
supra note 3, at 112. Tobacco smoke can increase the risk associated with hazardous material in the
workplace, in some cases causing a highly elevated risk of disease. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT SHEET:
WORLD No-TOBACCO DAY MAY 31, 1992; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., Office of Occupational
Health, and Tobacco or Health Programme, The Interaction of Smoking and Workplace Hazards: Risks
to Health, WHO Doc. WHO/OCH/TOH/92.1 (1992).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
103. David A. Kessler, Nicotine Addiction in Young People, 333 NEw ENO. J. MED. 186 (1995).
104. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 251. National legislation aimed at reducing smoking by the young
takes a variety of forms: (1) prohibiting sales of tobacco products to minors; (2) banning or restricting
tobacco vending machines; (3) banning smoking in educational institutions and other places frequented by
minors, including rock concerts and sporting events; (4) prohibiting distribution of free cigarette samples;
(5) restricting sales of smokeless tobacco products; and (6) prohibiting cigarette advertising and
sponsorship of sports events and rock shows. Id. at 120. For a global analysis of restrictions on tobacco
use by minors, see id. at 117-28; 2 SMOKE-FREE EUROPE, supra note 79, at 33-43.
105. See, e.g., Bartecchi et al., supra note 17, at 47; Kagen & Vogel, supra note 75, at 27. Despite
laws in all states regulating tobacco sales to minors, American children can easily buy cigarettes and other
tobacco products. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., H14S FACT SHEET, CHILDREN AND
TOBACCO: THE PROBLEM (Aug. 10, 1995).
106. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,134 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801,
803, 804, 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995). In July 1995, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
concluded for the first time that nicotine is a drug that should be regulated by the agency. See Philip J.
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children's access to cigarettes, such as requiring age verification and face to
face sales and eliminating mail order sales, vending machines, free samples,
and self-service displays. The proposed regulations also include measures to
reduce the appeal of cigarettes to children, such as banning outdoor
advertising within one thousand feet of schools and playgrounds; restricting
all billboard and other outside advertising to black and white text; prohibiting
the sale or distribution of products that carry cigarette or smokeless tobacco
product brand names or logos; prohibiting brand name sponsorship of sporting
and entertainment events; and requiring the industry to fund ($150 million
annually) a public health campaign to prevent children from smoking. 17
5. Mandatory Health Education
"Countries that have achieved a significant reduction in smoking...
have introduced strong educational programs" on the dangers of smoking.'0 8
Educational programs on tobacco vary among countries and include
educational programs in schools, public campaigns on smoking cessation, and
other programs mandated by general statutory requirements for public
information and health education on smoking. 0 9
Mandatory health warnings on cigarette packages and tobacco advertising
are another way to inform the public about the health consequences of
smoking. At least seventy-seven countries now require health warnings on
cigarettes, although in most of them the requisite warning labels are too weak
or too familiar to be effective in discouraging tobacco consumption."0 In
addition, a number of tobacco exporting states, including the United States,
exempt exported cigarettes from regulations on labeling and tar content."'
B. The Limitations of Unilateral Approaches to Tobacco Control: The
International Origins and Global Repercussions of the Tobacco Pandemic
Although a number of countries have significantly reduced the prevalence
of tobacco use through comprehensive legislation, tobacco regulation remains
weak or nonexistent in most countries, especially developing states, newly
Hilts, Tobacco Held to Be a Drug That Must Be Regulated, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1995, at A18. The
Clinton Administration's proposal authorized the FDA to begin the process of declaring nicotine an
addictive drug. Philip J. Hilts, Clinton to Seek New Restrictions on Young Smokers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
10, 1995, at Al.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HHS FACT SHEET, CHILDREN AND TOBACCO: THE
PROPOSAL (Aug. 10, 1995). For a discussion of smoking trends among American adolescents, see, e.g.,
Trends in Smoking Initiation Among Adolescent and Young Adults-United States, 1980-1989, supra note
87, at 528; Michael Janofsky, 25-Year Decline of Smoking Seems to Be Ending, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19,
1993, at A24.
108. See, e.g., Roemer, Leverage for Effective Policy, supra note 81, at 108. While effective health
education can exist without legislation, Professor Roemer has noted that the "enactment of legislation
making health education on smoking compulsory expresses government policy and ensures effective
implementation of educational programmes." ROEMER, supra note 3, at 129.
109. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 130. "Most countries have educational programs on the hazards of
smoking, but not all of them have enacted legislation making health education on tobacco mandatory, and
even fewer have legislation that allocates funds to such programs." Id. at 129.
110. Tobacco Legislation in Africa, supra note 78, at 9.
111. Bartecchi et al., supra note 17, at 51.
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industrializing states, and the formerly socialist states of Eastern Europe. By
1993 only two African states, one Southeast Asian state, and two Eastern
Mediterranean countries had instituted regulatory efforts to prevent young
people from smoking."t 2 Although nineteen countries in the Americas, seven
African countries, and five Southeast Asian states have instituted partial
legislative restraints on tobacco advertising,11 3 governments often fail to
enforce these regulations,11 4  or the tobacco industry finds ways to
circumvent them.' 5 This absence of effective domestic regulation has
created a lucrative opportunity for transnational tobacco industries to target
such countries. This section analyzes the global and domestic obstacles to
adequate national tobacco regulation. Because these barriers restrict the ability
of each nation unilaterally to control tobacco consumption and production
within its borders, it is urgent to forge international consensus and take
multilateral action.
National actors who want to reduce tobacco's domestic impact face
powerful internal political and economic resistance to effective domestic
regulation. Tobacco production and consumption have a superficial economic
appeal for many poorer countries. Over one hundred twenty states produce
tobacco,' 16 and domestic consumption generates substantial tax revenue for
many governments." 7
The assumption that tobacco production and sales necessarily benefit
national economies, however, must be questioned." 8 The true or social costs
of tobacco production and consumption include the costs of environmental
pollution,' 9 deforestation, 20 and most important, tobacco related mortality
112. ROEMER, supra note 3, at 251.
113. Id. at 250.
114. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 34, at A15 (describing how in many states of former Soviet Bloc
advertising regulations have "proved toothless or left loopholes that companies have been happy to
exploit").
115. See, e.g., ROEMER, supra note 3, at 42 (describing ineffectiveness of partial bans since they
permit tobacco industry to shift resources to other areas); Ramon Isberto, Asia-Health: More Fire and
Smoke in Tobacco War, Inter Press Service, May 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Newa Library, Inpres File
(describing how transnational tobacco conglomerates skirt advertising bans in Asia through indirect
advertising of brand names and logos on other products).
116. Melanie Powell, The Health Policy Implications of International Trade in Alcohol and Tobacco
Products, 84 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 1151, 1152 (1989).
117. Many developing states have highly regressive cigarette taxes that are often the single largest
source of a state's internal revenue, providing up to 15% of its total tax revenue. Stebbins, Tobacco or
Health, supra note 23, at 528. To many developing countries, tobacco seems to offer a "lifebelt,"
providing "jobs, revenue, exports, foreign exchange, education, training and prosperity." TAYLOR, supra
note 23, at 242. Consequently, tobacco production has generated a bond between developing states and
the tobacco industry. See id. at 261-73.
118. See, e.g., WHO Regional Office for Europe, Report on a WHO Seminar: The Economics of
a Tobacco-Free Society, WHO Doc. EUR/ICP/TOH 018(C), at 4 (1993).
119. The cultivation of tobacco contributes to soil erosion, and pesticides applied to tobacco fields
contaminate water supplies. PANOS BRIEFING, supra note 25, at 9-10.
120. About half of the tobacco planters in developing states burn large sections of tropical forest and
planted forests to process tobacco leaves. Id. at 6; Chapman, supra note 67, at 40. According to one
commentator, "the tobacco-caused deforestation problem is of major proportions in particular parts of the
developing world, most notably in Malawi, and in parts of Brazil (Rio del Sol), Zimbabwe, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Kenya. The situation in China and in other tobacco-growing parts of Asia remains unknown,
although ominous." Simon Chapman, Tobacco and Deforestation in the Developing World, 3 TOBACCO
CONTROL 191, 193 (1994). Processing tobacco causes substantial ecological damage. See PANOS BRIEFING,
supra note 25, at 6.
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and morbidity. For example, the direct and indirect medical costs to American
society for tobacco induced morbidity and mortality were estimated at $53
billion in 1984 alone. 12' Hence, tobacco production and promotion are not
as economically profitable for developing states as typically assumed. In many
states, the expansion of domestic tobacco consumption and production has
been based upon misguided notions of short term fiscal gains that have
overshadowed the long term costs to health, the environment, and
development.
Although an increasing number of states may now recognize the threat
that tobacco poses to their societies, countries desiring to reduce domestic
tobacco prevalence through legislation contend with competing demands for
limited national resources. For the public health sectors of many developing
states, overwhelmed by infectious and communicable diseases, 122 tobacco
control represents an emerging and much neglected health sector
exigency."z In addition, many poor states do not have an adequate
legislative foundation upon which to build public health strategies, including
legislative action to control tobacco. 124
Though national factors are significant, the factors that restrict the ability
of countries to combat effectively the tobacco pandemic are primarily
international. The transnational tobacco industry has dramatically advanced the
worldwide smoking epidemic by influencing a number of factors that have
increased global sales and consumption of tobacco products. Aggressive
advertising by multinational conglomerates and the targeting of susceptible
populations, including women and the young, increase domestic demand
throughout the developing world. Transnational tobacco companies have
focused not only on gaining entry into closed national markets throughout the
world, but also on blocking the imposition of national regulations that restrict
the advertising or sale of cigarettes.as In addition, political pressure by the
major western tobacco exporting states, particularly the United States, has
forced open markets and expanded advertising126 in importing countries.
121. Stebbins, Tobacco, Politics, and Economics, supra note 23, at 1318.
122. See, e.g., Allyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework
for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 304-09 (1992) (describing
how public health sectors of many developing states have been overcome by infectious diseases, including
cholera, malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS).
123. See generally Jamison & Mosley, supra note 67.
124. See, e.g., E. Najera et al., Health for All as a Strategy and the Role of Health Legislation:
Some Issues and Views, 37 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 362, 363 (1986) ("[Flew countries... have
expressly enacted legislation or legally binding regulatory instruments on which to base their activities to
ensure the protection and care of the health of their peoples.").
125. The history of national tobacco control efforts worldwide indicates that countries attempting to
domestically regulate tobacco "can expect a coordinated and intensive confrontation with the international
tobacco industry." Judith M. Mackay, Tobacco Control-Action and Obstacles, 15 CANCER DETEcTIoN
& PREVENTION 429, 431 (1991).
126. The U.S. trade policy has not only sought to lift trade barriers, but has also aimed at "forcing
[countries] to remove [advertising and marketing] restrictions they had imposed on themselves so that
American cigarettes could gain entree." U.S. Government Trade Policy Is Exporting America's Cigarette
and Lung Cancer Epidemic Abroad - NCAB [National Cancer Advisory Board] Told, 31 THE BLUE SHEET
5 (Dec. 14, 1988) (citing Kenneth Warner, Chair of the Department of Public Health Policy and
Administration at the University of Wisconsin); see also Levin, supra note 34, at A15 (describing how
trade officials, at insistence of industry, have pressured Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan to open
their markets to U.S. tobacco and allow firms to advertise their cigarettes). A 1990 report from the U.S.
1996]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 257
Western pressure has also led to a number of changes in developing and
newly industrializing countries that have reduced the price and increased the
demand for cigarettes. '27 In many of the poorer states, aggressive tobacco
promotion by the tobacco industry and western states simply overwhelms
underfunded national tobacco control efforts.
1 28
The potential profits of international trade in tobacco have also induced
many cash hungry governments to expand domestic production of tobacco and
to place less emphasis on public health. Many of the one hundred twenty
tobacco producing countries look to expand domestic production of raw
tobacco for export to provide much needed foreign exchange. 29 However,
few countries reap significant financial gains from tobacco exports. 30 Most
developing countries do not export tobacco, but rather produce it for domestic
use. t3 Among developing states that export tobacco, with the exception of
Malawi 3' and Zimbabwe, 33 the crop provides only a negligible part of
foreign exchange earnings.' 34 The transnational tobacco conglomerates'
virtual monopoly over tobacco exports thus thwarts developing countries'
attempts to earn significant national income from exporting tobacco.
General Accounting Office documents that the U.S. government and transnational cigarette companies have
resisted efforts to restrict marketing of U.S. tobacco in newly opened markets in Asia. Prakit Vateesatokit,
Letter from Bangkok: The Latest Victims of Tobacco Trade Sanctions, 264 JAMA 1522, 1524 (1990)
(citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRADE AND HEALTH ISSUES: REPORT To CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, Pub. GAO/NSAID 90-190 (1990)).
127. Council Report, supra note 34, at 3312. Increases in tobacco import quotas, lower tariffs on
tobacco products, and the proliferation of new foreign brands increase the supply of cigarettes, lead to
lower retail cigarette prices, and increase demand. Id.
128. Stebbins, Tobacco or Health, supra note 23, at 527.
129. For example, foreign exchange earnings from raw tobacco account for over 50% of all
agricultural export earnings in Malawi and Zimbabwe, and for about 10% in India, Paraguay, and South
Korea. Health: U.N. Renews Attack on Killer Tobacco Mindful of Poor, Inter Press Service, July 18, 1994
available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File. By 1977, developing states accounted for 60% of world
tobacco output. Id. Hard currency investment by transnational tobacco corporations in cigarette plants in
many countries, including those in central and eastern Europe, has also encouraged cash hungry countries
to place less emphasis on controlling the smoking epidemic. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
Bribes and kickbacks to officials are also "not unusual." Stebbins, Tobacco or Health, supra note 23, at
527.
130. Declining tobacco consumption in industrialized states and domestic content requirements have
lessened the profitability of tobacco exports. For example, recent U.S. legislation requiring American
made cigarettes to contain no more than 25% imported tobacco has further depressed imports from
developing states. Tobacco Industry Concerned About Domestic Content Law's Requirements,, 11 INT'L
TRADE REP. 465, 465 (1994); John Stackhouse, Tobacco: Third World Windfall and a Deadly Dilemma,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 4, 1994, at A25.
131. See discussion supra note 25.
132. Malawi accounts for 33% of world tobacco production. Gumisai Mutume, Southern Africa-
Commodities: Save Tobacco, Save Our Economies, Inter Press Service, Aug. 3, 1994 available in LEXIS,
News Library, Inpres File. Tobacco accounts for 80% of Malawian exports. Zimbabwe: Tobacco's
Struggle for Survival, AFR. ECoN. DIG., Reuter Textline, Aug. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Txtlne File.
133. The tobacco industry has an important place in the Zimbabwean economy and is one of the
country's largest employers. Mutume, supra note 132. Exports of tobacco bring Zimbabwe $414 million
per year - almost 30% of all export earnings - and constitute the single most important source of foreign
exchange. Id.
134. PANOS BRIEFING, supra note 25, at 1. In Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe collect 94% of the
continent's export earnings of tobacco, and the remainder of tobacco trading states, taken together, run
a trade deficit in tobacco. Simon Chapman et al., All Africa Conference on Tobacco Control, 308 BRIT.
MED. J. 189, 190 (1994). For these countries, therefore, the tobacco trade produces a net loss of foreign
exchange. Id.
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The tobacco epidemic has worldwide repercussions, not only for
developing nations and the states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union where smoking is now widespread, but in industrialized countries as
well. These repercussions restrict the ability of all nations to combat the
epidemic effectively.135 Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds earned $3 billion
from foreign sales of tobacco in 1993 alone; some transnational conglomerates
now reportedly make up to 60% of their profits from sales in developing
states. 136 These profits are arguably being used "to attempt to maintain the
current levels of consumption in developed countries by targeting some
vulnerable groups including young people and ethnic minorities" 137 through
advertising.
The tremendous global profits of the American and British tobacco
conglomerates may also be diverted to maintain consumption patterns in
industrialized states by financing costly efforts to oppose stringent tobacco
control laws. According to the Advocacy Institute, a Washington antismoking
group, legal fees incurred by American tobacco corporations in efforts to
repeal or prevent the imposition of tobacco control laws and in defending
lawsuits could be as much as $600 million annually in the United States.
138
In addition, tobacco conglomerates regularly support state and federal political
candidates with large donations. 139 Such contributions, among other things,
make the tobacco lobby "one of the most influential forces in the
government. "1
40
The global spread of the international communications media has
contributed to the ever increasing urgency and interdependence of global
tobacco control efforts. Foreign newspapers and magazines and new mass
communications media, such as cable and satellite television, restrict the
ability of individual countries to regulate tobacco promotion and advertisement
within their sovereign borders. Countries that have sought to restrict or ban
advertising have already experienced the problem of direct and indirect
advertising "overspill" from other states. 14' For example, even countries
with virtually total bans on tobacco advertising generally tolerate it in foreign
newspapers and magazines.1 42 Tobacco advertising on cable and satellite
135. Chapman, supra note 67, at 40.
136. Himelstein et al., supra note 27, at 25.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. For example, in the United States, the tobacco companies donated $5.6 million in federal
contributions during the 1992 election. Id. According to Business Week, tobacco lobbyists are also "out
in force" in states such as Maryland, California, and Massachusetts, where antismoking sentiment is high.
Id. For example, in the wake of proposed new federal regulations by the Clinton Administration to
regulate nicotine and tobacco marketing to children, the tobacco industry pumped more than $1.5 million
into national Republican party treasuries in the first half of 1995, a figure equal to five times the amount
contributed during the same period in 1994. Jane Fritsch, Tobacco Companies Pump Cash into Republican
Pary Coffers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at Al.
140. Bartecchi et al., supra note 17, at 48. "In 1989 it was reported that over a two year period, 420
of 535 congressional representatives and 87 of 100 senators accepted tobacco campaign
contributions .... " id.
141. See, e.g., 1 REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE COPENHAGEN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., IT CAN BE
DONE: A SMOKE-FREE EUROPE 34 (1990) [hereinafter I SMOKE-FREE EUROPE].
142. Telephone Interview with Ruth Roemer, Adjunct Professor of Health Law, UCLA School of
Public Health (Aug. 14, 1995).
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television is cause for even greater concern because it restricts the ability of
countries to control even direct advertising that is broadcast from abroad.,43
With the global proliferation of new mass communications media and the
rapid rise of international travel, advertising "overspill" is likely to become
even more widespread. Direct and indirect tobacco advertising and promotion
transcend national boundaries; they can no longer be regarded as purely
matters of domestic concern. Given the global integration of tobacco industry
finance and the global repercussions of tobacco advertising and promotion,
there is an inherent conflict between western tobacco exporting states' twin
policy goals of promoting tobacco exports and discouraging domestic
smoking.
The tobacco pandemic vividly demonstrates the ever increasing
interdependence of national efforts to protect public health. This global health
challenge is international in origin, has international repercussions, and
necessitates collaborative, multilateral action to encourage and assist countries
in the development and implementation of effective domestic regulatory
programs. In addition, the speed with which tobacco use has become a
worldwide epidemic demonstrates the urgency of prompt and effective national
and international action. Although the tobacco pandemic poses serious
challenges to national and international decisionmakers, it also offers an
opportunity for unprecedented international cooperation to protect global
health.
IV. WHO AND AN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TOBACCO CONTROL
A. The World Health Organization and the Tobacco or Health Programme
The World Health Organization,'" established in 1946,' is the
primary specialized agency charged with improving global health conditions.
With six regional offices, more than one hundred ninety member states, and
an annual regular budget exceeding $800 million per year, WHO is the largest
international health agency and one of the largest specialized agencies in the
United Nations. Most observers have customarily viewed WHO primarily as
an effective medical, technical organization. 4 6 In its traditional activities,
143. See, e.g., I SMOKE-FREE EUROPE, supra note 141, at 34.
144. WHO has a complicated, decentralized structure, with central headquarters in Geneva, six
regional offices, and many country and field offices. PAUL F. BASCH, TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH 342 (1990). At the global headquarters, the World Health Assembly determines overall policy
of the organization. WHO CONST. supra note 4, art. 18,. The Executive Board, which consists of 32
technically qualified individuals, is responsible for giving effect to the policies of the Assembly. Id. arts.
24, 28. The Secretariat consists of the Director-General and a technical and administrative staff. Id. art.
30. The Director-General, nominated by the Executive Board, is WHO's chief technical and administrative
officer. Id. art. 31.
145. Representatives of 61 states signed the WHO Constitution on July 22, 1946, at the International
Health Conference held in New York City from June 19 to July 22, 1946; the Constitution became
effective on April 7, 1948. WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 1 n.1.
146. WHO regularly formulates and adopts technical recommendations that command respect because
of WHO's reputation for technical expertise. See HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF
INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 319 (2d ed.
1984).
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WHO has been described as one of the "most valuable" agencies of the
United Nations system. 47
Although WHO is not the only international agency involved in health
matters,148 the United Nations Charter and WHO's constitution endow WHO
with the duty to provide global leadership in international health in general.
The structure of the relationship between the United Nations and WHO is
grounded in the United Nations Charter,'49 particularly in those sections that
describe the objectives of the United Nations. Article 55 of the United Nations
Charter describes the goals that the United Nations has pledged to promote
among its members, including "solutions of international economic, social,
health and related problems."'50
The U.N. General Assembly has overlapping jurisdiction within the field
of health"' and the legal authority to address the global problems of tobacco
control. However, as the specialized agency with the primary constitutional
directive of acting as the "directing and co-ordinating authority on
international health work,"52 WHO bears the cardinal responsibility for
implementing the aims of the U.N. Charter with respect to health.
Furthermore, article 1 of WHO's constitution proclaims that the organization's
fundamental objective is the "attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health."' 53
WHO and its regional offices have played a critical role in establishing
the scientific foundation for global action against tobacco154 and in
encouraging and assisting countries to develop domestic regulatory
frameworks for tobacco control. Since 1970, the World Health Assembly has
also enacted a number of resolutions emphasizing WHO's priorities in tobacco
control, including urging countries to adopt specific strategies for tobacco
147. DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 34 (1995).
148. See, e.g., BASCH, supra note 144, at 326-53 (describing organizations working in international
health).
149. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 3; 55-59; 63-64.
150. Id. art. 55(b).
151. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 259-60
(1986). Acting within the framework of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly has the legal
capacity to study and discuss the international problems of tobacco and to promulgate nonbinding
recommendations designed to promote global tobacco control efforts. Article 13, l(b) of the U.N.
Charter commands the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations... promoting
international cooperation in the ... health [field]." In addition, the General Assembly has the legal
capacity to provide a forum for the negotiation of a multilateral tobacco control agreement that establishes
law for the parties to the instrument. U.N. CHARTER art. 13, l(b). Article 13, l(a) of the U.N.
Charter empowers the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations ... encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codification. . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 13,
1(a). Although the General Assembly lacks express legislative powers, it has discharged its obligation
to encourage the "progressive development of international law and its codification" by acting as a
facilitator for the creation of international legislative rules through the traditional treatymaking process.
Id. See generally Robert E. Riggs, The United Nations and the Politics of Law, in POLITICS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 41, 43-46 (Lawrence S. Finkelstein ed., 1988). Like other specialized agencies,
WHO has only a treaty relationship with the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 57; see also
Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, in WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTs,
supra note 4, at 41.
152. WHO CoNST., supra note 4, art. 2(a).
153. Id. art. 1.
154. See ROEMER, supra note 3, at 3.
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control and strengthening WHO's collaboration on tobacco with member
states, other United Nations organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations."55 In 1990, WHO established the Tobacco or Health
Programme as a separate entity within WHO5 6 in order to strengthen
tobacco control efforts. The key component of WHO's Programme involves
collaborating with member states to formulate policies and strategies for
national tobacco control programs 5 7 and providing technical advice and
support for national tobacco regulation.
Despite the operational accomplishments of WHO's global tobacco
campaign in the last twenty-five years, the organization acknowledges that it
has been unable to develop or sustain national commitment to domestic
tobacco regulation. Comprehensive national tobacco control policies that meet
all or nearly all of WHO's recommendations exist, WHO concedes, in "only
a very few countries.'
Recognizing the need to strengthen international efforts to promote
national tobacco control activities, WHO is considering the role that
international legal instruments can play in its tobacco control strategies. In
October 1994, the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco or Health adopted a
resolution urging national governments and WHO to prepare and realize an
international convention on tobacco control to be adopted by the United
Nations."5 9 In May 1995, the World Health Assembly responded to the
155. See, e.g., WHO Programne on Tobacco orHealth, Exec. Bd. 89th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item
24.1, at 3-4, WHO Doc. EB89/INF.DOC./5 (1991); WHA Res. 42.19, 42nd World Health Assembly,
WHO Doc. VHA42/19891REC/I (1989), compiled in 3 WORLD HEALTH ORG., HANDBOOK OF
RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE ExEcuTiVE BOARD:
1985-1992, at 55 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter WHO, HANDBOOK]; WHA Res. 44.26, 44th World Health
Assembly, WHO Doc. WHA4411991/RECI1 115 (1991), compiledin WHO, HANDBOOK, supra, at 56-57,
In 1986, the World Health Assembly launched a global public health approach to tobacco control, urging
countries to adopt a comprehensive approach to tobacco control, including the critical regulatory measures,
detailed in Part 11I above. See WHA Res. 39.14, 39th World Health Assembly, compiled in WHO,
HANDBOOK, supra, at 53-54.
For a review of WHO's cooperation with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations on
tobacco control efforts, see WHO Progranmne on Tobacco or Health: Implementation of Resolutions
WHA42.19, WHA43.16 and WHA45.20, Report by the Director General, 46th World Health Assembly,
Prov. Agenda Item 19, WHO Doc. A46/10 (1993). At the end of 1993, a focal point on multisectoral
collaboration was designated within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
to promote and strengthen tobacco control strategies. See, e.g., Coordination Questions: Multisectoral
Collaboration on Tobacco or Health: Progress Made in the Implementation of Mulisectoral Collaboration
on Tobacco or Health: Report of the Secretary General, Prov. Agenda Item 9(c), at 3, ECOSOC Doc.
E/1995/67 (1995) [hereinafter Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco]. For a description of activities of
intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations in tobacco control, see id. at 9-12 and
Draft Addendum to Report of the Secretary-General on Mulisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco or Health
(E/1995/67), ECOSOC Doc. El19951671Add.1 (1995).
156. See, e.g., C. Chollat-Traquet, Tobacco or Health: A WHO Programme, 28 EUR. J. CANCER,
311 (1992). In May 1994, the Tobacco or Health Programme was relocated to the WHO's Programme
on Substance Abuse. World Health Org., Tobacco or Health Report by the Director General, Exec. Bd.
95th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, at 2, WHO Doc. EB95/27 (1994).
157. See, e.g., WHO Doc. EB89/INF.DOC./5, supra note 155, at 5.
158. WHO Doc. EB95/27, supra note 156, at 4.
159. Resolutions of the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco or Health, art. 4(b), reprinted in
Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco, supra note 155, annex II. For a background proposal for a global
regulatory approach to tobacco control, see Allyn L. Taylor, International Legislation to Combat the
Tobacco Pandemic, Paper Presented at the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco or Health, Paris, France
(1994) (on file with author).
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Conference's call for an international tobacco strategy. In resolution
WHA48.11, the World Health Assembly began formal consideration of
alternative international regulatory approaches to tobacco control. Resolution
WHA48. 11 called upon the Director-General of WHO to report to the May
1996 Assembly on the "feasibility of developing an international instrument
such as guidelines, a declaration, or an International Convention on Tobacco
Control to be adopted by the United Nations." 6"
B. The Role of WHO in an International Strategy for Tobacco Control
As the premier authority on world health matters, WHO has a unique
opportunity to propel an international strategy for tobacco control, promoting
and guiding government action on multilateral tobacco control instruments that
detail national obligations of states to protect the health of their populations.
WHO has the legal authority and public health expertise to serve as the
platform for the development of an international regulatory approach to
tobacco control. The question is whether WHO has the organizational capacity
to do so.
WHO has traditionally eschewed the use of international legislative
strategies to promote its health policies. There are several possible
explanations for this attitude. An organization's behavior is shaped by many
aspects of its external and internal environment. In addition to
membership,16 these aspects include its processes, structures, and key
personnel. 62 An organization's behavior also reflects its culture - the
pattern of basic assumptions existing within the organization.
WHO's traditional conservatism regarding the use of legal institutions
reflects the cultural predispositions of the organization. 63 Historically, the
medical professionals who constitute the key leadership of the organization
have seemed to share a common understanding that efforts to achieve the
organization's health goals should not include a legal component. WHO has
encouraged the formulation of binding standards only in two very limited and
traditional areas of international public health regulation; 64 moreover, WHO
officials have acknowledged that the organization's lawmaking efforts in these
160. WHA Res. 48.11, supra note 5, at 1.
161. WHO's reluctance to develop public health law reflects, at some level, its members' goals and
policies. The behavior of public international organizations traditionally has been understood exclusively
as the reflection of the interest of their dominant coalitions or key financial members. ERNST B. HAAS,
WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 57-58
(1990); see also Taylor, supra note 122, at 339-40 (describing financial and structural constraints limiting
WHO's autonomy to implement independent decisions).
162. Factors that may affect the behavior of international organizations include ideology, voting,
representation, secretariat autonomy, the status of outside experts, leadership, political goals, and
institutionalization. HAAS, supra note 161, at 89-92.
163. Taylor, supra note 122, at 343; see Jay M. Shafritz & J. Steven Ott, The Organization Culture
School, in CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 373, 374, 378 (Jay M. Shafritz & J. Steven Ott eds., 2d
rev. ed. 1987). "Culture" has been defined as a "deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are
shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic 'taken-for-
granted' fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment." Edgar Schien, Defining
Organization Culture, in CLAssIcs OF ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra, at 381, 384.
164. These are Nomenclature Regulations and International Health Regulations. S.S. FLUSS & F.
GUTTERIDGE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 15-19 (1993).
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areas have been a "failure."' 65 Senior health legislation officials at WHO
have commented that this disposition to avoid legal strategies represents a
"reluctance within the organization to indulge in what might be termed the
'making of official science,' a reluctance shared with its forbears."66'
WHO's conservative culture is clearly among the most significant factors
contributing to the organization's past avoidance of legal strategies.
Accordingly, WHO may not be able to transcend its conservative anti-law
culture and to foster a legislative foundation for tobacco control. A strong
organizational culture can dominate the organization's behavior and constrain
it from making needed changes. Nonetheless, an organization's culture can
evolve and develop. '67 Crisis is the greatest stimulus of change in
international organizations.' 68 More precisely, organizational evolution is
triggered not by crisis itself, but by the organizational leaders' perceptions of
the circumstances. 69 If the leaders do not perceive traditional solutions as
capable of resolving the crisis, then they may employ innovative approaches.
The growing urgency and complexity of the tobacco pandemic have
inspired WHO's leaders to consider adopting innovative legal strategies.
Patterns of organizational behavior that contradict WHO's traditional culture
are beginning to emerge. For example, resolution WHA48.11's call for
considering international legal instruments to promote WHO's health policies
is clearly contrary to WHO's traditional practice. Of course, it remains to be
seen whether WHA48.11 represents a step toward genuine organizational
evolution or adaptation 70 of WHO's conservative anti-law culture, or
merely a temporary and inconsequential deviation from established
procedures. '7 Nevertheless, WHO's unconventional consideration of the
role that international law and institutions can play in promoting world public
health protection policies suggests that WHO's leaders may be rethinking and
expanding the organization's traditional scientific, technical approaches to
international health.
Current challenges facing WHO indicate that the time may be ripe for the
165. S.S. Fluss & Frank Gutteridge, Some Contributions of the World Health Organization to
Legislation, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 35, 41 (Thomas A. Lambo & Stacey
B. Day eds., 1990).
166. Id. at 42.
167. See, e.g., HAAS, supra note 161, at 17-49.
168. See generally Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 7he Architecture of Culture and Strategy Change, in
CLAssIc READINGS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 615, 626 (J. Steven Ott ed., 1989) (discussing
galvanizing events).
169. Id. at 617.
170. According to Ernst B. Haas, organizational adaptation, as opposed to evolution, is marked by
small, incremental growth. "Adaptation is incremental adjustment, muddling through .... Because
ultimate ends are not questioned, the change in behavior takes the form of a search for more adequate
means to meet the new demands." HAAS, supra note 161, at 34. Nevertheless, adaptation can result in the
successful application of new practices.
171. Although unconventional, WHA48.11 falls far short of being concrete evidence of
organizational evolution. As Ernst B. Haas has noted, mere ad hoc or episodic use of innovation does not
amount to effective institutionalization of new practices. "Successful institutionalization takes place only
when [such innovations] are consistently used and fully integrated into the regular decision-making
process." Id. at 86. At best, WHA48.11 does not even reflect such an ad hoc use of innovative behavior.
It is a call to consider the role that international legislative efforts can play in global tobacco control efforts
and thus falls far short of even an endorsement of an international legislative framework.
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evolution of the organization's conservative anti-law culture. The growing
complexities of responding to the international burden of disease are testing
the organization's capacity to maintain its reputation as the foremost authority
on international health. Yet, these challenges have also created an
extraordinary opportunity for the leaders of WHO to reshape the way in
which the organization thinks and acts.
However, WHA does not cast WHO as the platform for an international
convention on tobacco control. WHA suggests instead that such an instrument
should be generated under the United Nations' auspices.172 While the United
Nations has the authority to steer the massive effort needed to create an
international strategy on tobacco control, the efficiency and perhaps the
existence of such a strategy may be severely compromised if WHO neglects
to assume the primary responsibility for such global efforts. WHO has the
principal responsibility, and the legal and technical capacity, to lead the
development of an international regulatory framework, initiate discussion
among member states, and facilitate the setting of international standards for
global tobacco control. In contrast, the General Assembly lacks both the
expertise and the time 73 necessary to facilitate the negotiation and supervise
the implementation of complex tobacco control standards. 7 4 Hence, despite
WHO's oft-noted bureaucratic inefficiencies, 75 the organization's public
health expertise is essential to forging an international political consensus for
public health protection, generating complex, technical norms on tobacco
control, and assisting states to implement such norms.
Advancing the global struggle against the tobacco crisis through a
legislative framework presents an extraordinary opportunity for WHO to
reaffirm and strengthen its commitment to global public health and to enhance
its prestige within the international community. WHO must develop from a
biomedical, technical organization into an institution with the capacity to use
innovative strategies, including legislation, if it is to provide leadership on a
regulatory strategy for tobacco and for global public health matters generally.
V. AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR TOBACCO CONTROL
The development and implementation of international public health law
172. See supra note 151.
173. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 151, at 265; see also G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 266-77 (describing factors involved in choice of lawmaking arenas).
Although a variety of considerations are theoretically appropriate to the choice of lawmaking forums,
Danilenko notes that "experience demonstrates that the actual impact of these concepts depends on the
configuration of effective power in a given area of relations."Id at 272.
174. The General Assembly does, of course, have the authority to involve WHO in the development
of a U.N. international strategy on tobacco control as well as in the drafting and implementation of an
international convention sponsored under U.N. auspices. However, given the frequent absence of effective
interagency coordination in the United Nations' system, WHO's critical role in this process may be
drastically and unwisely curtailed if the health agency abandons its critical leadership role in the global
struggle against tobacco. In recent years, specialized agencies have increasingly complained that the
General Assembly is "legislating more and more, and in ever greater detail" in fields that "are clearly the
responsibility" of one of the specialized agencies. MERON, supra note 151, at 260 (citing UNESCO Doc.
l10/EX/19, para. 67 (1980)).
175. See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, WHO at Country Level - A Little Impact, No Strategy; World Health
Organization, 309 Brit. Med. J. 1636 (1994).
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to promote national action on tobacco control can contribute critically to
WHO's campaign for a smoke free world. Encouraging states to develop
binding and specific international legal commitments to control tobacco may
powerfully influence states to rethink priorities and redirect resources to
combatting the tobacco epidemic through a national regulatory framework.
Although an international regulatory strategy on tobacco may face political
opposition from the tobacco industry and some states, the ability of other
international organizations I 6  to encourage states to adopt cogent
international standards on issues fraught with political conflict indicates that
WHO may have the authority to promote and guide governmental action by
serving as a platform for the codification of international law.
The successful international standard setting efforts of other international
organizations can serve as a precedent, model, and guide in WHO's efforts
to achieve international action on tobacco control. The establishment of other
international organizations as centers for policy debate and international
codification regarding controversial issues suggests that international
organizations, including WHO, may have a degree of independence adequate
to promote and guide governmental action and achieve bargains and
compromises on politically charged issues, including tobacco control.
Of course, tobacco is a divisive political issue. Accordingly, there is good
reason for skepticism about the ability of WHO to alter state behavior and to
encourage the codification and implementation of effective international
tobacco control instruments. The ability of an international organization to
influence national decisionmaking is limited in a world order dominated by
independent states.'" States are generally reluctant to sacrifice any
autonomy to international organizations. 7 ' The one hundred twenty tobacco
producing nations may be disinclined to support the development of an
international regulatory approach to tobacco control, and powerful tobacco
exporting countries, including the United States and Great Britain, may
176. These organizations include the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Labour Organization (ILO).
177. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 147, at 29.
178. See, e.g., HAAS, supra note 161, at55-61. WHO's efforts to develop international public health
law on tobacco control may face jurisprudential objections. In the latter half of this century, international
law has moved away from a traditional vision of an international society of sovereign states with supreme
authority over their respective territories. In particular, the need of states to cooperate in order to solve
essential problems in a number of realms, including human rights and environmental protection, has
precipitated the gradual erosion of the traditional concept of state sovereignty. Environmental protection
and the treatment by a state of its own nationals have become subjects of international concern and action
as states have created binding international legal standards. See, e.g., A.A. Cancado Trindade, The
Contribution of International Human Rights Law to Environmental Protection, with Special Reference to
Global Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 244, 245-50
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE]; Jonathan 1. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993); see also Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 228-
39 (1979) (analyzing development of international human rights law). In contrast to the evolution of
international cooperation and the harmonization of state behavior in human rights, environmental
protection, and other realms of global concern, decisionmaking in international public health is still steeped
in the statist model of international law. International cooperation in public health law is functionalist and
restricted to limited, technical concerns. Although the international community's ability to combat the
tobacco pandemic depends upon international cooperation facilitated by effective international institutions
to guide governmental behavior, states may not yet acknowledge that multilateral action is necessary to
protect global public health.
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strongly oppose any international regulation that threatens tobacco
exports. 179 Furthermore, the transnational tobacco conglomerates, which
have tenaciously opposed the development of national tobacco control
regulations, will wield their considerable economic and political power to
obstruct any international legislation on tobacco control.
Yet the politics of global tobacco control are not clear cut. Recent
revelations that the tobacco industry has long possessed and concealed
knowledge about the addictive qualities of nicotine, as well as sharpened
interest in national tobacco regulation in some states, including the United
States, have highlighted the issues of tobacco control worldwide and created
a critical opportunity for WHO to serve as an effective forum for the
protection of global public health. Notwithstanding opposing forces, therefore,
WHO can achieve progress in global tobacco control by initiating, sponsoring,
and coordinating international tobacco negotiations.
Given the modest level of current global commitment to tobacco
regulation, WHO should adopt a measured, gradual approach to international
standard setting to achieve global consensus. Instead of encouraging states to
codify a single instrument, as suggested in WHA48.11,180 WHO should
develop political consensus for international action on tobacco control over
time, first promoting global support for the adoption of a noncontroversial,
nonbinding instrument and then progressively encouraging the adoption of
binding legal commitments of increased scope and strength. 181
This dynamic and continuous model of international standard setting has
been used frequently and sometimes effectively by other international
organizations and can serve as a precedent for WHO. International law has
developed in this manner in fields as diverse as the international protection of
human rights18 and the status of outer space.' 83 Perhaps the most
179. Great Britain, for example, obstructed a proposed European Community Directive to ban
virtually all tobacco advertisement within the European Community. Tobacco ProvesAddictive, supra note
91, at 152, 155.
180. WHA Res. 48.11, supra note 5, at 3(1).
181. An alternative international regulatory approach to tobacco control is the development of
international instruments directly addressing the responsibilities of transnational tobacco corporations.
However, as neither states nor public international organizations, multinational corporations are not
traditional subjects of international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW § 207
(1988). Commentators have considered how to develop international regulatory models for the conduct of
transnational corporations. See, e.g., Gunther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The
Challenge to International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 66-68
(Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991). International law offers only a few examples of such a regulatory
approach. For example, strict liability has been established through treaty for ship operators and nuclear
plant owners for marine pollution and nuclear hazard. See, e.g., Toru Iwama, Emerging Principles and
Rulesfor the Prevention and Mitigation of Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note
178, at 107, 109. Thus, as Gunther Handl has suggested, "it is unlikely that, at anytime soon
[transnational corporations'] legal status would be upgraded to the point where they could be both a direct
claimant and respondent under international law without any mediation by states." Handl, supra, at 67.
At times, of course, transnational enterprises are treated as "partial or functional subjects of international
law." Id.; see also infra note 209 (describing international codes of conduct for transnational corporations).
182. Widely known examples of this process are U.N. General Assembly human rights resolutions
in areas including torture, racial discrimination, and the rights of children, later followed by detailed
conventions. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "legislate essentially what the Universal Declaration [of Human
Rights] had declared." Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 20 (1990) (citing International Bill of Human
Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/565 (1948)).
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 257
celebrated examples of the development of international standards through this
dynamic process have been in the area of environmental protection by such
organizations as UNEP and the IMO. t" Other multilateral organizations are
now applying the model to emerging areas of international concern. For
instance, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) is at work on the development of a nonbinding intergovernmental
declaration on the human genome, to be followed by the codification of a
binding treaty.' 85 The modest level of global commitment to tobacco control
also suggests that an incremental and dynamic approach to international
standard setting will be the most effective way to achieve international action
to reduce the prevalence of tobacco. By providing an ongoing diplomatic
forum, over time WHO may heighten governmental concern about tobacco
control and perhaps transform that concern into widespread support for the
adoption and implementation of an international convention mandating national
tobacco regulation.
Of course, the effective lawmaking experiences of UNEP, the IMO, and
other international organizations may not accurately indicate WHO's potential
to garner broad support for international 'tobacco control legislation. On the
one hand, tobacco control shares the characteristic of "scientific certainty"
that has galvanized international action in some realms of environmental law,
including acid rain and the ozone layer.8 6 The latter was addressed through
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal
Protocol, and the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, in which
UNEP fostered broad political consensus among states for measures to reduce
depletion of the ozone layer.187 Like the ozone hole above Antarctica which
led to the conclusion of the Montreal Protocol,' 88 the health consequences
of tobacco consumption are scientifically firmly established. 89
183. See, e.g., PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (1992); Alexandre Kiss, The Inplications of Global Change for the International
Legal System, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 178, at 315, 320.
184. See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 183, at 320. An example is the partial hardening of UNEP's Cairo
Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, which served
as a forerunner to the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes. Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, UNEP Governing Council Decision
14/30, at 83, U.N. Doe. A/42125 (1987); Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention];
see also Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 213, 240 (1991) (discussing hardening of UNEP soft law by international practice).
185. Declan Butler, Ethics Treaty to Target Genomne Implications, 371 NATURE 369, 369 (1994).
186. See generally LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE
EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 63 (1994) (discussing impact of scientific evidence on international
action).
187. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516;
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537, 541 [hereinafter London
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol].
188. SUSSKIND, supra note 186, at 66; Edward A. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, In
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27, 30-34 (Peter
M. Haas et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH]. But see, e.g., Holed Up: Chemical
Production, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 63 (describing how Montreal Protocol is being undermined by
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) smuggling in rich states and heightened production in developing states).
189. See supra Part II.A.
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On the other hand, the tobacco pandemic lacks some of the features that
have led to the more successful environmental agreements, including the
Montreal Protocol. For example, the proposed restrictions of the Montreal
Protocol were actually supported by one of the industry leaders, Dupont. 90
In addition, in a number of the successful environmental treaties, international
organizations were able to forge political consensus with regard to issues that
would appear, at least at first glance, to be of more universal concern than
domestic tobacco regulation. Perhaps most importantly, many successful
international agreements, including the Montreal Protocol, have sought to
protect the environment by regulating the market behavior of producers.
While a global tobacco control convention shares this characteristic in part,
it would also ultimately seek to change deeply ingrained human behavior.
International efforts can have only a limited effect on the social, cultural, and
physiological forces that drive individuals to consume tobacco.
Although WHO may not be able to mirror the standard setting success
achieved in a number of environmental agreements, the organization can still
play an important, albeit limited, role in containing the tobacco pandemic by
educating and motivating national leaders to rethink priorities and to redirect
attention to controlling the tobacco pandemic using a continuous and dynamic
international strategy. WHO's efforts to achieve global public support for an
international regulatory framework may stimulate national policy change and
thus make a dramatic contribution to curtailing the spiraling pandemic even
if WHO is ultimately unable to secure global consensus on far-reaching
international norms.
The process of seeking international agreement can encourage nations to
adopt and implement effective national measures to contain the tobacco
epidemic by expanding global concern and by increasing the political,
financial, and technical capacity of states to make adjustments in their
domestic policy. Although this legislative prescription may not lead to the
attainment of a smoke-free world, the development of an international
legislative strategy for tobacco control may be a reasonable and politically
achievable approach to progressive implementation of national standards to
prevent the further spread of the tobacco pandemic. This would be vastly
preferable to the existing rule vacuum.
The rest of this part describes how WHO can apply this model of
incremental international standard setting to secure global consensus and
action on tobacco through a two stage strategy. The part first discusses the
role of nonbinding intergovernmental resolutions in an incremental standard
setting strategy and then analyzes the critical role that the eventual
development of binding international norms can have in promoting national
and international action on tobacco.
A. Nonbinding Instrument: A U.N. Resolution
As a first step leading to codification of an international convention on
tobacco control, WHO should encourage member states of the United Nations
190. Parson, supra note 188, at 46.
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to recommend, by joint declaration, common rules of national conduct on
tobacco regulation. Other international organizations' experience of lawmaking
demonstrates that declaratory resolutions, although not technically binding,
can sometimes establish normative standards that influence states' behavior
and can serve as forerunners to the formalization of international obligations
in binding treaty law. The effectiveness of intergovernmental resolutions,"'
particularly resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,'92 in
affecting the behavior of states in other realms of international law indicates
that WHO should adopt this strategy to heighten global concern about tobacco
control in member states and to promote support for the development of a
binding international convention on tobacco containment.
The advantage of a nonbinding intergovernmental resolution as a first step
is that seeking international consensus on such an instrument will probably not
engender strong political opposition. In contrast to treaty law, a nonbinding
resolution does not establish legal commitments. Hence, it allows states to
confront the global problems of tobacco collectively without restricting their
freedom of action. '93 In addition, the simplified procedures and diminished
voting requirements for adopting resolutions will enable international tobacco
control to receive the attention of the international community more quickly
than it would through multilateral treatymaking approaches, which generally
take more time to negotiate, conclude, and bring into force.'94 In sum,
consensus on a nonbinding U.N. resolution on tobacco control may be a
relatively quick and politically achievable first step in a dynamic and
continuous process of international standard setting.
Although nonbinding resolutions of intergovernmental organizations are
often mere rhetorical and political gambits, experience in the United Nations
demonstrates that such instruments can significantly affect state practice. For
191. The United Nations and its specialized agencies produce a wide variety of nonbinding
instruments, including Recommendations, Guidelines, Codes Of Practice, Standards, and Declarations of
Principles, which are generally adopted in the form of intergovernmental resolutions. BIRNIE & BOYLE,
supra note 183, at 16. Resolutions are usually intended to be nonbinding instruments expressing the
common interests of many states in specific areas of international cooperation. See id. at 19.
192. Controversy surrounds the legal significance of General Assembly resolutions. As one authority
has suggested: "While there are writers who openly claim that United Nations General Assembly
resolutions constitute a new source of law, the majority of commentators prefer to base their arguments
upon the effectiveness of the rules proclaimed by the General Assembly." DANILENKO, supra note 173,
at 203. The principal argument against the view that U.N. resolutions constitute a new source of law is
that the U.N. Charter accords the General Assembly no authority to enact rules of international law. Id.
at 205; see discussion supra note 151; see also ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 24 (1994). This argument is bolstered by the fact that states
generally do not accept General Assembly resolutions as law. DANILENKO, supra note 173, at 205. As one
authority has suggested: "States often don't meaningfully support what a resolution says and they almost
always do not mean that the resolution is law." G. Arangio-Ruiz, 7he Normative Role of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and the Development of Principles of Friendly Relations, [ 19721 3 RECUEIL
DES COURS 431, quoted in HIGGINS, supra, at 26.
193. A nonbinding written format can "either enable states to take on obligations that otherwise they
would not, because these are expressed in vaguer terms, or conversely, [this] form may enable them to
formulate the obligations in a precise and restrictive form that would not be acceptable in a binding
treaty." BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 27.
194. At the World Health Organization, for example, the adoption of conventions requires a two-
thirds vote of the World Health Assembly. WHO CONST., supra note 4, art. 198; see also infra notes 226-
27 and accompanying text (describing slowness of treatymaking process).
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example, international environmental lawmaking has included a large number
of U.N. resolutions and declarations. At times, such intergovernmental
resolutions have been highly persuasive, and the conduct of states has tended
to follow the principles embodied in these nonbinding pronouncements.
Nonlegal texts, such as the World Charter for Nature"'5 and the Stockholm
Declaration of 1972,196 have had a catalytic impact on state practice. 97
The effectiveness of some nonbinding international proscriptions in changing
the environmental practices of states has led some commentators to refer to
them as "soft law."' 9'
The basis for the effectiveness of some nonbinding instruments in
modifying national conduct has been much speculated upon. Although
technically nonbinding, intergovernmental resolutions may point to emerging
social values of international public order199 and "thus help extend the realm
of legitimate international concern to matters of previously exclusive national
jurisdiction."2" Intergovernmental resolutions may also encourage national
action by setting standards and providing direction. 20' Furthermore,
diplomatic and moral pressure can be employed to encourage state parties to
comply with an intergovernmental resolution.
In a number of realms, including the international protection of human
rights, the status of outer space, and international environmental law, national
observance of nonbinding instruments has paved the way for binding treaty
law by generating an ongoing diplomatic forum. Nonbinding resolutions of
international organizations may promote the development and implementation
of international law by magnifying public attention, stimulating a reassessment
of national interests, and generating new information that can educate states
about the consequences of their actions. Hence, "[d]espite the fact that states
retain control over the degree of commitment, the very existence of such an
195. The World Charterfor Nature, G.A. Res: 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982).
196. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
197. E.g., Kiss, supra note 183, at 320. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has also
influenced national behavior through nonbinding instruments. For example, the IMO's International
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code has been enacted by over 45 states, including all major ship-owning
states. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 29-30.
198. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 181, at 63; Kiss, supra note 183, at 319-20. See generally Tadeusz
Gruchalla-Wesierski,A Frcaneworkfor Understanding "Soft-Law", 30 McGILL L.J. 38 (1984) (discussing
enforceability of soft law). One authority defines soft law as follows: "Generally a norm may be "soft"
when it either does not constitute part of a binding regime, whether of conventional or customary law, or
because, even though it is contained in a binding instrument, it is not expressed in obligatory language."
Paul C. Szasz, International Norm-making, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 178, at 41, 70.
International environmental law provides numerous examples of the soft law approach to international
standard setting. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 16. See generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law
and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 420 (1991) (describing effectiveness
of soft law instruments in influencing national behavior).
199. Kiss, supra note 183, at 319-20.
200. Handl, supra note 181, at 63-64.
201. See, e.g., R.S. Pathak, The Humans Rights System as a Conceptual Framework for
Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 178, at 205, 238-39. Intergovernmental
resolutions create the expectation that they will be respected. Myres S. McDougal, Contemporary Views
on the Sources of International Law: The Effect of U.N. Resolutions on Emerging Legal Norns, 73 PROC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 300, 328 (1979).
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instrument encourages the trend towards hardening the international legal
order." 2o2
Not all resolutions of intergovernmental organizations lead to the
development of formalized obligations or even become a significant factor in
state practice. Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly that are
supported by influential states2 °3 are among those intergovernmental
resolutions that are most likely to influence state behavior and lead to the
codification of international law. As Ian Brownlie has observed, the
"acceptance [of General Assembly resolutions] by a majority vote constitutes
evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the
expression of such opinions. "21
General Assembly resolutions often have a political significance that can
stimulate the lawmaking process in other international organizations. 5 For
example, UNEP, one of the most prolific lawmakers in the United Nations
system, has sought to harness the potential political significance of General
Assembly resolutions in the law creation process. UNEP's Governing Council
has, on occasion, drafted environmental law guidelines and principles and
submitted them to the General Assembly, which has either incorporated them
in a resolution or recommended them to states for use in the formulation of
national legislation or international conventions.2"
Recognizing UNEP's favorable experience with General Assembly
resolutions, WHO should encourage member states of the United Nations to
recommend, by joint declaration, that states adopt joint rules of national
conduct and formulate, adopt, and implement an international convention on
tobacco control under WHO's auspices. 0 7
202. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 27.
203. "[U]nless the more powerful and influential governments are prepared to carry out the
resolutions of the General Assembly, the verbiage of the resolutions may have no more effect than
harmless blowing off steam." PETER BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990S
58 (1994).
204. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (3d ed. 1979). General
Assembly resolutions "may be said to be generally representative of world opinion." BIRNIE & BOYLE,
supra note 183, at 19.
205. MERON, supra note 151, at 265-66.
206. See, e.g., Pathak, supra note 201, at 238; Sand, supra note 184, at 239-40.
207. Although WHO is the primary authority on world health matters, the United Nations General
Assembly has overlapping jurisdiction within the field of international health and the legal authority to
adopt nonbinding recommendations on tobacco control. See supra note 151. The General Assembly also
has the authority to make formal recommendations to the specialized agencies, including WHO, that the
agencies are required to take into account. See MERON, supra note 151, at 259. The General Assembly
has addressed global health issues in a number of nonbinding recommendations, primarily the health
concerns or right to health of particularly vulnerable populations, including persons with physical or mental
disabilities. See, e.g., Prevention and Control ofAcquired inmtnnodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), art. 5(a),
G.A. Res. 187, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 114, U.N. Doc. Al45/49 (1990); Declaration
on the Rights of Disabled Persons, art. 6, G.A. Res. 3447, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at
88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, art. 2., G.A.
Res. 2856, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). There is precedent
for interorganizational cooperation between the General Assembly and WHO. For example, in 1981 the
General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, which were drafted in cooperation with WHO.
The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 119,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No 49, Annex, at 188-192, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); see, e.g., Eric
Rosenthal & Leonard Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy Under the "Principles for the
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In the context of tobacco control, the potential effect on national behavior
of a nonbinding resolution alone, even a U.N. declaration, should not,
however, be overstated. Given the modest level of current global commitment
to tobacco control and the powerful interests of the tobacco industry, it is
doubtful that mere nonbinding proscriptions by member states of international
organizations can significantly influence many national tobacco control
policies. At worst, isolated nonbinding resolutions may actually inhibit
progress towards global action on tobacco control, since their voluntary
format enables states to relieve some public pressure without committing to
real action. Notably, WHO's numerous recommendations on tobacco control
strategies in the last twenty-five years have proven insufficient to slow the
growth of tobacco consumption or production.08
Although a U.N. declaration alone will not profoundly affect member
states' policies of tobacco control, the experience of other international
organizations suggests that, with active organizational promotion, it can
constitute a feasible and critical first step toward the formalization of
obligations in a binding treaty or convention. 0 9 In addition, the process of
states proposing and deciding on a resolution in the General Assembly will
further tobacco control efforts in ways that developing a declaration in the
World Health Assembly cannot. While the primary participants in WHA's
policy debates and strategy development are state ministers of health,
technocrats who generally lack significant domestic power, there is
widespread participation of political leaders in the General Assembly.
Discussion and debate on tobacco control strategies in the General Assembly
can thus raise the political profile of tobacco control issues, encouraging
national political leaders adequately to consider this daunting health issue. It
can also create an opportunity for WHO to inform and educate the
international community about the true costs of tobacco consumption and
production.
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness", 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHOL. 257 (1993).
208. See discussion supra text accompanying note 161.
209. An alternative first step is the development of an intergovernmental code of conduct.
Intergovernmental codes of conduct adopted by member states of international organizations have generally
established voluntary, nonbinding, often vague standards or principles for guiding the behavior of
governments and private entities, typically transnational corporations. See generally JOHN M. KIINE,
INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS (1985); Robert E. Lutz & George D. Aron,
Codes of Conduct and Other International Instruments, in TRANSFERRING HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES
AND SUBSTANCES: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE 131 (Gunther Handl & Robert E. Lutz eds.,
1989). Discussion here is limited to codes of conduct that are enacted as recommendations. See, e.g.,
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and the Use of Pesticides, U.N. Food and Agricultural
Organization, U.N. Doc. M/R8130, E/8.8611/5000 (1986). There are few examples of codes of conduct
adopted as treaties. See, e.g., United Nations Final Act of Conferences of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences, Apr. 6, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 910; Andean Commission: Andean Standard
Code on Multinational Enterprises and the Regulations with regard to Subregional Capital, 11 I.L.M. 357
(1972). The code of conduct approach has some significant disadvantages. In particular, negotiating and
implementing an intergovernmental code of conduct on politically charged issues may be a particularly
slow process that may delay and perhaps obstruct effective national and international action. An extreme
example is the draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which was
negotiated from 1976 until the project was suspended by the General Assembly in Integration of the
Conmnission on Transnational Corporations into the Institutional Machinery of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, G.A. Res. 49/130 (1994).
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B. Legally Binding Instrwnents: Framework Convention-Protocol Approach
Through a measured, dynamic, and continuous approach to international
standard setting, using U.N. resolutions as a first step, WHO may gradually
develop global political consensus for the adoption and implementation of
binding international norms on tobacco control. This section details the
function of multilateral lawmaking in an international strategy for tobacco
control and considers alternative international regulatory strategies that WHO
can use to promote global agreement and action.
The experience of multilateral environmental organizations that have
achieved some success in serving as platforms for international treatymaking
may serve as a precedent and model for global efforts to control the tobacco
epidemic.2"0 The United Nations and its agencies have become key catalysts,
sponsors, and coordinators for multilateral environmental negotiations,
stimulating international consensus and action on a wide range of global
environmental concerns through the development and implementation of
international law. Indeed, most environmental treaty negotiations are now
initiated by international organizations, particularly by UNEP, which has
become the primary catalyst for international environmental agreements in
recent years. 2 '
The ability of multilateral environmental institutions to encourage and
assist states in overcoming powerful and organized industry resistance to
regulation through the traditional treatymaking process is further evidence of
the important role that active organizational support for international
lawmaking could play in efforts to regulate the activities of the transnational
tobacco conglomerates. For example, the International Maritime Organization,
through the formation of a powerful coalition of states, has helped states to
overcome the resistance of influential oil and shipping interests and to foster
international agreement and action on measures to control marine pollution
through a number of international conventions. '2 As a further example,
210. Specific areas of international legislative activity, closely related to the issues in global tobacco
control, set critical precedents for global tobacco control efforts. For example, the international regulation
of ozone depleting substances in the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol marks the first time the
international community has sought to limit the production and use of a particular man made product. See,
e.g., Department of Econ. & Social Dev. Transn'l Corps., International Environmental Law: Emerging
Trends and Implications for Transnational Corporations, Environment Series No. 3, at 19, U.N. Doc.
STICTCI137 (1993). An emerging area of international legal activity that may be particularly relevant to
global tobacco control efforts is international norms related to corporate advertising. Particularly
noteworthy is the 1989 European Economic Community Directive on the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities. "The Broadcasting Directive establishes minimum standards for, inter alia, television programme
and television advertising content, and provides that 'television advertising shall not ... encourage
behaviour prejudicial to the protection of the environment.'" Id. at 21 (quoting 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23).
This legislation is powerful evidence of the extent to which states may be willing to place limits on
corporate marketing techniques in order to protect the environment and public health.
211. SUSSKIND, supra note 186, at 24; see also Gonzalo Biggs, The Montevideo EnvironmentalLaw
Programne, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 329-30 (1993) (describing accomplishments of UNEP's legal
division between 1981 and 1991 as "formidable"); Mark A. Gray, The United Nations Environmental
Progrwmne: An Assessment, 20 ENvTL. L. 291, 297-306 (1990); Parson, supra note 188, at 35; Sand,
supra note 184, at 239-40.
212. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 53-56; see also, International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 735; International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319. As a further example, authorities
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authorities credit regional organizations for enabling states on the North and
Baltic Seas to override industry objections and adopt and implement
conventions to control marine pollution in these seas.213 Indeed, "every
international environmental agreement has some substantive implications for
industry"2" 4 and has the potential for generating substantial costs for
business concerns if implemented as national law. 1 5 Overall experience in
international standard setting in the U.N. system suggests, however, that "the
dynamics of international negotiations . . . and sometimes coalition pressures,
can force nations to take positions they might not have taken on their
own."216 Thus, the process of international standard setting can assist
nations in overriding powerful industry resistance to costly and restrictive
regulation.
In responding to the international community's demand for rapid and
effective lawmaking, treaties have become a flexible concept encompassing
extremely diverse manifestations of state consent to be bound. 217 A primary
criterion in the selection of any treaty instrument to forge international
consensus and action on tobacco control, however, must be the political
acceptability of such a mechanism. Although treaties are a useful medium for
creating international norms, many either do not enter into force or do so for
only a limited number of states. 21t Given the politics of global tobacco
control, there may be difficulty in forging sufficient political consensus for
binding rules.
Perhaps the least effective treaty that can be used to promote global
credit the IMO for increasing global concern over oil pollution and thus helping states overcome industry
resistance to international regulations imposing substantial equipment costs on the industry. See, e.g.,
Ronald Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution of the Oceans, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH, supra note
188, at 183, 186. Commentators also have noted that, through its lawmaking efforts, UNEP encouraged
states to bring a multibillion dollar industry to a halt to protect the ozone layer, despite the objections of
some of the industry leaders. See, e.g., William R. Moomaw, Protecting the Ozone Layer: A
Revolutionary Approach to Evolutionary Treaties, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS
IMPACT ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 329, 335 (Eric Urbani et al. eds., 1994).
213. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Protecting the Baltic and North Seas, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH, supra note 188, at 133, 134.
214. Judith T. Kildow, The Impact of International Environmental Treaties and Agreements on
Corporate Strategy, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR, supra note 212, at 281, 295.
215. The importance of international organizations in environmental policy standard setting is
reflected in the fact that industries have formed multinational and nationwide associations to negotiate with
international organizations. See id. at 294.
216. Id. at 284.
217. Treaties are a traditional and frequent method of creating binding international legal standards.
See STATUTE OF THE ICJ art. 38(1)(a). Pursuant to the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, a
treaty is defined as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties extends this basic
definition of a treaty to international agreements concluded between states and international organizations
and to agreements concluded among international organizations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, Feb. 18-Mar. 21,
1986, art. 2, at 4, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 129/15.
218. In the absence of a supranational authority, both' the codification and implementation of
international law depend upon the will of states. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory
and Practice: General Course in Public International Law, 178 ACAD. OF INT'L L. OFFPRINT FROM THE
COLLECTED COURsES 32-39 (1982-V) (on file with author).
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tobacco control action is one that aims to be comprehensive, in that it lays
down clear, detailed, and specific rules. The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea,2" 9 originally intended to govern all uses of the ocean,
exemplifies the comprehensive convention. To use this model for global
tobacco regulation, WHO could encourage states to adopt a comprehensive
convention, mandating that states enact extensive tobacco control regulations
that encompass all of WHO's recommendations for the last twenty-five years,
including the critical regulatory strategies outlined in Part III above.
There are, however, decisive barriers to using the comprehensive
convention approach for global tobacco control. There may be particular
difficulties in gathering global support for a comprehensive tobacco control
convention that requires states to enact extensive regulation. There are further
difficulties in obtaining widespread ratification of such an instrument without
significant reservations.220
The most politically feasible strategy for securing global support for
tobacco control is the framework convention-protocol approach. Unlike a
comprehensive treaty, the convention-protocol approach does not attempt to
resolve all significant issues in a single instrument. Rather, states first adopt
a framework convention that calls for international cooperation in realizing
broadly stated goals. Ideally, the parties to the convention will then conclude
separate protocols containing specific measures designed to implement these
goals.22'
The convention-protocol approach to the creation of international law is
likely to be more politically acceptable than any other binding approach to
global tobacco control. Although technically binding, framework conventions
actually fall somewhere between nonbinding resolutions and treaty law since
they contain no explicit obligations. Nevertheless, the framework convention
creates an institutional forum in which states can cooperate and negotiate for
the conclusion of implementing protocols containing detailed obligations.
The convention-protocol approach may be particularly well suited to
efforts to secure global agreement and action on the tobacco epidemic because
it is a continuous and dynamic process of lawmaking that can gradually and
incrementally build support to reduce tobacco use. As a categorical model for
standard setting, the convention-protocol approach is also consistent with the
approach to tobacco control taken by most states. Thus, the development of
a framework convention may be more likely to secure political consensus and
significant action on tobacco control- than any other form of binding
instrument.
219. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 20, 1982, 211. L.M. 1261 [hereinafter
Law of the Sea Convention].
220. The experience of the Law of the Sea Convention shows that an ambitious, comprehensive
format that seeks to resolve all substantive issues in a single instrument may paralyze negotiations. On
November 16, 1994, more than 25 years after negotiations of the Convention began, the Law of the Sea
Convention entered into force. For an appraisal of the Law of the Sea Convention, see generally John R.
Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Future of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88
AM. J. INT'LL. 488 (1994) and Philip Allott, Mare Nostrum:A New International Law of the Sea, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 764 (1992).
221. See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 13; Handl, supra note 181, at 61-63; Iwama,
supra note 181, at 112-13 (discussing "double-track" approach).
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The convention-protocol approach has been uspd , frequently and
sometimes successfully to secure international agreement and action on
environmental matters.2" An early instance in this field was the 1979
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
22
In the most celebrated use of this method, UNEP fostered broad political
consensus among states for measures to reduce depletion of the ozone layer,
resulting in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the
Montreal Protocol, and the London Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol.224 The Framework Convention on Climate Change is also
patterned on this convention-protocol format.22
The convention-protocol approach does have particular drawbacks as an
international lawmaking strategy. For example, although the treatymaking
process is generally slow, 6 the convention-protocol approach may be
particularly sluggish since it requires at least two rounds of international
negotiation and national ratification. 7 Another potentially critical limitation
of the convention-protocol approach is that, like nonbinding instruments, it
may actually inhibit progress toward the codification of concrete international
norms for the global control of tobacco. The broad format of the framework
convention enables states to relieve public pressure for action without
resolving to take concrete steps to control tobacco production and
consumption.228
International environmental organizations have developed various
techniques to deal with these shortcomings. 29 WHO can use many of these
strategies to prompt timely consensus and action on cogent implementing
protocols to an international tobacco control convention. For example,
environmental framework conventions and protocols are often designed to
encourage state parties to adopt implementing protocols by mandating regular
222. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 181, at 61-63; Kiss, supra note 183, at 321-22.
223. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 19
I.L.M. 11 [hereinafter Bonn Convention]; see Kiss, supra note 183, at 322.
224. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 187; Montreal Protocol,
supra note 187; London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 187.
225. Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part Il)/Add.1 (1992).
226. According to a 1971 United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) study,
multilateral treaties do not generally become effective until two to twelve years after the formal agreement
has been reached, with the average being about five years. See U.N. INST. FOR TRAINING & RESEARCH,
TOWARD WIDER ACCCEPTANCE OF U.N. TREATIES 34-40 (1971).
227. For example, the first protocol to the 1979 Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 18 I.L.M. 1446, was signed five years after the
convention was adopted. Protocol to the 1970 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on
Long-term Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), Sept. 28, 1984, 27 I.L.M. 701. The fourth protocol
to the Convention was adopted 12 years after the Convention was signed. Protocol to the 1979 Convention
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Concerning the Control of Emission of Volatile Organic
Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 1.L.M. 573.
228. The experience of international law making also indicates that when states with strongly held
and widely divergent interests try to reach an agreement on implementing protocols, they often settle on
international standards reflecting the lowest common denominator. Sand, supra note 184, at 219.
229. See generally id. at 248-75 (discussing import/export controls, licensing requirements,
notification schemes, and environmental audits).
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and institutionalized meetings of the participating parties." The Convention
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals expressly requires
periodic review of the progress made and evaluation of the need to take
additional measures." Periodic review and assessment are also a basic
feature of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
the Montreal Protocol thereto. 2 Periodic meetings of the contracting parties
encourage states rapidly to adopt protocols containing cogent obligations by
drawing public attention to the issues and debates. This, in turn, may generate
public pressure for national accountability. 3 In the case of some framework
conventions, the mandatory provisions for consultation "offer the prospect of
a virtually continuous legislative enterprise."" The success of other
international organizations in using periodic meetings of contracting parties to
forge international consensus indicates that this process should be included as
a basic provision of an international convention on tobacco control.
Another legislative technique commonly used to secure agreement and
action on environmental framework conventions and implementing protocols
is to structure the agreements to generate the widest possible consensus by
using broadly framed international obligations coupled with requirements for
implementation through domestically crafted legislation. For example, the
International Maritime Organization has employed the technique of nationally
designed implementation measures to secure international agreement on
environmental matters. In the Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation, each nation is required to set up its own national
system for preparedness and response, including a national contingency
plan. 5 Through this model of lawmaking, the international legislation
developed by the IMO and other international organizations has been both
detailed enough to confer specific obligations upon member states and broad
enough to cultivate political consensus and accommodate the divergent
circumstances of individual nations.
The combination of broadly framed international agreements and
requirements for implementation through domestically crafted legislation is
particularly appropriate for global tobacco control efforts. WHO can formulate
common tobacco control principles in such a way that they can be applied
230. Handl, supra note 181, at 61-62.
231. Bonn Convention, supra note 223, art. VII, para. 5.
232. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 187, art. 6.; Montreal
Protocol, supra note 187, art. 6; see also Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 225, art. 7(a) (establishing same for Framework Convention
on Climate Change).
233. Amplifying public pressure by publicizing meetings and conferences of contracting parties to
an international convention can help conquer low levels of government concern, overcome industrial and
governmental resistance to international regulation, and provide international organizations with the
opportunity to quickly advance negotiations. Marc A. Levy et al., Improving the Effectiveness of
Intenational Environmental Institutions, in INsTITUTIONs FOR THE EARTH, supra note 188, at 397, 399-
400. For example, regional institutions helped to amplify domestic environmental concern and political
pressure on the states of the North and Baltic Seas to act on marine pollution by developing Ministerial
Conferences and by widely publicizing the results of such conferences. Haas, supra note 213, at 133-134.
234. Handl, supra note 181, at 62.
235. See International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, supra
note 212.
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effectively in each nation despite unique health circumstances and cultural
conditions. Such common tobacco control principles and criteria can be
developed because, as described above, tobacco control legislation reveals a
variety of trends common to states despite differences among them. In
practical terms, however, a standard body or model of legislation cannot be
established. Implementing protocols on tobacco control must be conceived and
drafted to form broad guidelines that can be harmonized with the legislation
of individual nations. Through these techniques and others developed by
multilateral organizations, 6  WHO can encourage speedy adoption,
ratification, and implementation of international norms on tobacco control.
Although both the United Nations General Assembly and WHO have the
legal capacity to sponsor the creation of a framework convention and of
implementing protocols on tobacco control, such instruments should be
drafted, negotiated, and implemented under WHO's auspices. As described
above, the General Assembly has neither the expertise nor, perhaps, the time
to engage in negotiating complex standards with regard to tobacco control,
particularly if extensive negotiation of an international instrument is
required. 7 Statutory provisions concerning the complex technical issues
surrounding tobacco control should be established and supervised by WHO -
the most qualified and experienced international organization in the fields of
public health and tobacco control.
WHO's constitution confers authority upon the World Health Assembly
to develop three types of instruments: (1) conventions under article 19; (2)
regulations under article 21; and (3) nonbinding recommendations under
article 23.11 Although WHO's authority under article 21 is strictly limited,
the organization's legal capacity to encourage member states to adopt
recommendations or conventions extends to any matter within the competence
of the organization. Hence, WHO has broad legal authority to facilitate an
international tobacco control convention.
Although WHO must ultimately look to states to execute treaties and
236. Rapid implementation of a tobacco control convention also can be encouraged by developing
a treaty which establishes "selective incentives" for the parties. For a discussion of "selective incentives,"
see Sand, supra note 184, at 221. In environmental treaty bargaining, the selective incentives most
commonly used are access to funding, resources markets, technology, and technical advice and assistance.
Id. at 221-24; see also infra Part V.C.2 (describing role of technical and financial assistance in supporting
global tobacco control convention). WHO can also beat the bottom line approach characteristic of many
treaties by following the examples set by international environmental agreements and by promoting
overachievement among state parties. See Sand, supra note 184, at 231. For example, many international
environmental conventions expressly confirm the right of parties to take more rigorous measures than are
required by the conventions. One example is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES
Convention], reprinted in Sand, supra note 184, at 232. In cases where national achievements are reviewed
frequently, compared internationally, and widely publicized, any over-achievement may pay political
dividends to states, while underachievement can result in heightened public awareness and public pressure.
Sand, supra note 184, at 233.
237. See MERON, supra note 151, at278.
238. WHO CONST., supra note 4, arts. 19,23, 21. For an analysis of WHO's authority to encourage
states to adopt binding and nonbinding international instruments, see generally CHARLES H.
ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 49-56 (1973); FLuss & GUTTERIDGE, supra note 164, at 9-22; Claude-Henri Vignes, Towards
the Harmonization of Health Legislation: The Role of the World Health Organization, 46 INT'L DIG.
HEALTH LEGIS. 422 (1995).
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fulfill commitments, it can use its constitutional powers to mobilize support
for and initiate action on an international tobacco control framework
convention and the associated implementing protocols. The success of UNEP,
the IMO, and other international organizations in stimulating national action
on environmental and other international concerns demonstrates that
international organizations can influence member state decisionmaking by
providing a forum for creating legally binding international norms. Their
ability to foster political consensus for binding international norms in
politically charged areas in which the relevant industries strongly resist
regulation suggests that WHO may have some effect on the global tobacco
political process.
C. Implementation of an International Strategy for Tobacco Control
WHO has the legal capacity and public health expertise to serve as a
catalyst, sponsor, and negotiator for multilateral tobacco control instruments
detailing national obligations to counter the tobacco epidemic. To ensure that
efforts to develop international instruments are not purely symbolic, WHO
must establish mechanisms to overcome some governments' incapacity or
apathy, as well as other nations' resistance to such regulation. Although WHO
must ultimately look to nations to fulfill international commitments, it can
generate incentives that change the balancing of national interests and
encourage compliance with international instruments on tobacco control. This
section details some of the specific strategies that WHO can employ to
encourage national implementation of binding and nonbinding international
tobacco control instruments.
1. System of National Monitoring and Reporting
Monitoring the implementation of state obligations is perhaps the most
powerful mechanism available to international organizations to ensure that
states give adequate attention to their international commitments. Disclosure
of substandard national efforts in an international arena can create powerful
pressure on governments to comply with their international obligations to
implement tobacco control policies. 9
International human rights law and international environmental law
provide numerous examples of effective supervisory institutions.24 There
are different approaches to international monitoring of multilateral
commitments. A common approach in encouraging compliance with
international instruments is a system of periodic national reporting.24' This
239. See, e.g., Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical
Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENTS: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160
(James N. Rosenay & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (describing effectiveness of "politics of shame"
in international system).
240. See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 183, at 326-29 (explaining that surveillance methods were created
in field of international protection of human rights and extended to international protection of
environment).
241, See, e.g., Elisabeth Kornblum, A Comparison of Self-Evaluating State Reporting Systems, 35
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 39 (1995).
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strategy requires participating states to submit reports on measures they have
adopted and progress they have made in fulfilling international commitments.
Institutionalized periodic review of states' performance is a basic feature of
many international environmental conventions,242 including the Montreal
Protocol.243 A weakness of the reporting system, however, is that much of
its effectiveness depends upon the accuracy with which states report on their
own conduct. 244
Recognizing the limitations of state self-reporting systems, international
organizations have developed other forms of monitoring to secure national
implementation of international instruments. One highly effective mechanism
is regular auditing of member state compliance by an independent, technical
committee. The procedure developed by the International Labour Organization
(ILO), for example, combines annual or biennial reporting by governments
with regular auditing by an independent committee. The ILO Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations then
publicly debates the audited reports.24 With the active participation of both
trade unions and employers' associations, this auditing procedure has "turned
into a worldwide public hearing that clearly induces more compliance by
governments than the threat of any intergovernmental action would. "246
Recognizing the United Nations' favorable experience with national
reporting and auditing programs, WHO can use its own constitutional
reporting procedure to promote member state compliance with an international
tobacco control instrument. Pursuant to article 62 of WHO's constitution,247
member states must report to WHO annually on measures taken to implement
WHO's recommendations, regulations, or conventions. This procedure could
be transformed into an effective supervisory mechanism if WHO critically and
publicly reviewed state reports on national tobacco control measures. In
addition, an institutionalized national reporting or auditing system could be
incorporated into the structure of a binding international instrument on tobacco
control.
242. See, e.g., Basel Convention, supra note 184, art. 13 (requiring states to submit annual report
on all aspects of transboundary trade and disposal of regulated substances and on "such matters as the
conference of the Parties shall deem relevant"); CITES Convention, supra note 236, art. III (providing
that state parties must maintain records of trade in listed species and report on number and type of permits
granted).
243. Montreal Protocol, supra note 187, art. 7. The United Nations' experience with periodic human
rights reporting systems indicates that member states' reports can promote state compliance with
international obligations if the reports are critically evaluated by international organizations that can also
obtain information from nongovernmental sources. Philip Alston, The United Nations' SpecializedAgencies
and the Implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 96-99, 100-01 (1979); see also Virginia A. Leary, Lessons for the Experience of the
International Labour Organization, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 580, 595-602 (Philip
Alston ed., 1992).
244. See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 183, at 167.
245. For an analysis of the ILO procedure, see generally Leary, supra note 243, at 595-602.
246. Sand, supra note 184, at 273. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights uses a comparable
procedure of state reports and public hearings, in which nongovernmental organizations actively
participate. Id.; see also Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 243, at 369, 397-407 (describing process of submission of reports and
examination by Human Rights Committee).
247. WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 15.
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2. Technical and Financial Assistance: An International Tobacco
Control Fund
Establishing international technical and financial assistance arrangements
is an essential ingredient of successful tobacco control efforts. As noted
above, many states simply lack the administrative and technical capacity to
develop and implement cogent tobacco control legislation, while other states
are highly dependent on tobacco tax revenue.24 Appropriate funding is
crucial to finance tobacco control measures in the least developed countries,
train personnel in tobacco control strategies, support monitoring and
implementation of tobacco control measures, and fund crop substitution
programs. Establishing programs for technical advice and assistance has been
critical to the success of a number of U.N. programs, including programs of
the ILO249 and international population institutions.' 0 As authorities have
aptly noted, "International [organizations], when they are effective, are not
merely rulemaking bodies. They are also vehicles for transferring skills and
expertise, and for empowering domestic actors who are motivated to solve
domestic problems of international importance.'"21
Establishing sufficient funding for the implementation of the international
tobacco control instrument is critical. Indeed, neither the World Bank nor the
FAO currently funds tobacco crop substitution programs in developing
states. " 2 There is an immediate need for international organizations to
reexamine health priorities, including the importance of tobacco control.25'
WHO can dramatically assist states by encouraging the international donor
community to recognize tobacco control as a development priority and by
establishing a global network for the mobilization of tobacco control
financing.
Existing international financial assistance models provide a launching
point for considering a new global financial program to support
implementation of international instruments on tobacco control. 2 4 One
paradigm is provided by the 1990 London Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The
amendments established a $240 million multilateral trust fund to assist
248. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
249. Leary, supra note 243, at 589 (describing how technical assistance efforts have underscored
and have been integrated with standard setting by ILO).
250. Barbara B. Crane, International Population Institutions: Adapting to a Changing World, in
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH, supra note 188, at 351, 390-92.
251. Levy etal., supra note 233, at413-14.
252. See, e.g., Multisectoral Collaboration on Tobacco, supra note 155, at 6-8; Pamphil Kweyuh,
Tobacco Costs the Earth, PANOSCOPE, Oct. 1994, at 14.
253. A cost effectiveness study carried out by the World Bank "revealed a number of neglected and
emerging health problems which should be accorded far greater priority. Topping the list of emerging
problems are the tobacco related diseases." Jamison & Mosley, supra note 67, at 18-19. Nevertheless, the
low priority that the World Bank has characteristically assigned to tobacco control is reflected by the fact
that the 1980 World Bank Health Sector Report did not even mention tobacco related diseases. Id. at 18.
254. See John C. Dernbach, The Global Environment Facility: Financing the Treaty Obligations of
Developing Nations, 23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10124, 10124-32 (1993); Theron A. Mehr, Comment,
International Technology Transfer: Constructing and Financing an Environmental Program, 15 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 731, 743-46 (1993).
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developing states in meeting their obligations under the Protocol. 5 Another
example is the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established by the World
Bank as a general fund to aid developing countries in correcting global
environmental problems. 6 The GEF is overseen and administered by the
World Bank with the assistance of UNEP and the United Nations
Development Programme. 7  WHO should consider establishing an
international financial support mechanism within the context of a global
tobacco control convention or developing a separate facility apart from a
binding convention to support tobacco control efforts. Such a fund can be
managed under the authority of any number of organizations, including WHO
or the World Bank.
3. Role of Other International and Nongovernmental Organizations
Multisectoral collaboration of a wide range of organizations will be
required to implement effectively an international instrument on tobacco
control. Given the lack of support for tobacco control programs by many
international organizations, WHO must enlist the support of other multilateral
organizations by effectively informing and educating the international
community about the impact of the tobacco pandemic and about strategies to
prevent its spread. In addition to financially promoting tobacco control
programs, other international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations' s ' can assist WHO's efforts by promoting support for
appropriate tobacco control policies among their constituencies."
Collaboration with other international organizations in the development
and implementation of an international convention also may advance WHO's
efforts to curb the growth of tobacco use through a regulatory framework.
Given WHO's limited experience in the politics and processes of sponsoring,
drafting, negotiating, and implementing international legal instruments,
collaboration with other intergovernmental organizations experienced in
securing international agreement and action on instruments of high technical
quality may prove critical to the success of an international strategy for
255. London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 187, part T, art. 10 (amendment to
article 10 of the Montreal Protocol). But cf. Holed Up, supra note 188, at 63 (noting that industrialized
states failed to pay $26 million of $149 million pledged in 1994). Similar trust funds have been established
under a number of international environmental conventions, all using weighted contributions based on the
global assessment scale set forth by the U.N. General Assembly. See Sand, supra note 184, at 224-26.
256. See Mehr, supra note 254, at 744.
257. See id.
258. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a significant role in efforts to adopt and
implement an international tobacco control instrument. NGOs can spotlight the importance of global
tobacco control measures and influence states to adopt an international instrument on tobacco control. In
addition, NGO participation may be critical for effective monitoring of national compliance with an
international tobacco control instrument. The history of human rights periodic national reporting and
auditing systems in the United Nations is evidence of the essential role that NGOs can play in international
normmonitoring. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Finkelstein, The Politics of Value Allocation in the UN System,
in POLITIcS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, supra note 151, at 1, 28-30; Leary, supra note 243, at 601,
617.
259. UNCTAD, the United Nations designated focal point on tobacco, can assist WHO's efforts by
ensuring that the multisectoral approach to tobacco control takes place in a timely and effective manner.
See supra note 155 (describing role of UNCTAD in global tobacco control efforts).
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tobacco control. For example, UNEP, whose mandate is closely related to the
purposes and aims of global tobacco control efforts, could facilitate WHO's
preparatory work with its extensive and successful experience in developing
and implementing international legislation closely related to human health. 210
In addition, the ILO, the international organization with the most successful
and extensive record of utilizing international supervisory institutions in the
U.N. system, could assist WHO in the development of a monitoring institution
to promote effective implementation of tobacco control norms.
WHO's collaboration with other international agencies experienced in the
dynamics of international lawmaking on a regulatory framework for tobacco
control may als6 contribute to WHO's evolution away from its conservative
anti-law culture through a process of cross fertilization. There are numerous
examples of "transfers of experiences and procedures" from one organization
to another in the annals of the United Nations.26' Collaboration with
international organizations that are more skilled in international standard
setting and less conservative in outlook, such as UNEP and the ILO, may
stimulate WHO's dormant and, perhaps, politically suppressed ability to
develop and contribute to the acutely necessary evolution of WHO's anti-law
culture.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that WHO has both the cardinal responsibility and
the extraordinary opportunity to serve as a platform for international
instruments, stimulating national and international action on tobacco control.
Tobacco presents an extraordinary global public health hazard. The time is
ripe for WHO to revise existing strategies and to encourage and assist national
regulation of tobacco through the employment of international instruments.
Utilizing an international regulatory strategy, WHO can expand contemporary
global awareness of tobacco's health hazards and generate top level political
attention, agreement, and action on tobacco control.
The experiences of other multilateral organizations that have achieved
some success in serving as platforms for international standard setting and
implementation may guide WHO's efforts to develop international policies on
tobacco control. WHO should incrementally develop political consensus, first
promoting a noncontroversial U.N. General Assembly declaration on agreed
upon policies, and then progressively moving to a WHO framework
convention and implementing protocols of increasing strength and scope.
WHO can facilitate the transition from a framework convention to
implementing protocols by encouraging states to develop and implement
multilateral agreements that are similar to the international environmental
260. There is established precedent for interorganizational cooperation between WHO and UNEP.
For example, most of WHO's environmental projects are tackled in collaboration with UNEP, including
the 1981 WHO/FAO/UNEP Memorandum of Understanding Governing Collaboration in the Control of
Water Borne and Associated Diseases in Agricultural Water Development Activities. Paul C. Szasz,
Restructuring the International Organizational Franework, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANoE, supra note 178,
at 379-83.
261. Id. at 379-83.
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agreements described in this Article. Hence, WHO should advance a
framework convention that institutionalizes ongoing meetings of the parties to
the convention. As global political support for concrete measures develops,
protocols focused on high priority, commonly advocated measures 62 can be
incrementally adopted. WHO can promote compliance with protocols by
drafting agreements containing general principles of tobacco control
obligations, coupled with requirements for implementation through
domestically crafted legislation.
WHO must also establish mechanisms to enlist the support of
governments faced with many competing concerns and to overcome states'
resistance to regulation. A system of monitoring and national reporting can
exert powerful pressure on states to comply with their international obligations
to protect their populations from tobacco. In addition, generating an
international tobacco control trust fund from the international donor
community and wealthy states is critical to the success of an international
strategy for tobacco control.
Although WHA48.11 urges the development of an isolated instrument to
further global tobacco control efforts, the current weak level of global
commitment to tobacco control underscores the inevitable inadequacy of a
single shot approach. In contrast, a dynamic and continuing long term plan
that focuses on incremental and modest targets has a greater likelihood of
encouraging national action to control tobacco.
Advancing an international regulatory strategy does, of course, pose some
political risks for WHO. Given the politics of global tobacco control, WHO
may ultimately hinder tobacco control efforts and the institution itself if it
broadly interprets its mandate and aggressively confronts nations. However,
this Article has outlined a strategy, modeled upon the successful experiences
of other international organizations, that WHO can adopt to avoid becoming
a political battleground in efforts to achieve international consensus and action
on tobacco. The adoption of a measured approach to the development of
international instruments can allow the global regulatory initiative to keep pace
with the political feasibility of tobacco control in member states, and thus
possibly ward off claims that WHO is inappropriately interfering in public
health matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states.
Collaboration with other organizations in an international regulatory
strategy may also serve to protect WHO from charges of politicization. This
Article has recommended that efforts to achieve an international convention
should be preceded by an endeavor to garner a U.N. General Assembly
resolution endorsing both WHO's directives on tobacco control and the
eventual codification of an international convention under WHO's auspices.
In addition, the involvement of other international organizations, such as
UNEP and the ILO, in the preparatory talks and drafting of an international
convention and protocols on tobacco control can also fend off claims that
WHO is a rogue organization by adding weight and legitimacy to the
262. WHO can assess political consensus for the adoption of key protocols, including, for example,
protocols on tobacco ingredients and measures to prevent young people from smoking, by circulating
questionnaires among convention participants.
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international strategy. Hence, with significant collaboration from other
international organizations, WHO can actively encourage international
consensus and action on tobacco control while limiting political risks to the
organization.
WHA48.11 creates a pivotal opportunity for WHO to stimulate national
action on tobacco control by becoming an effective forum for the development
and implementation of international instruments. In the present world order
dominated by independent nations, WHO and other international organizations
can have only a limited influence on the conditions that have driven the
tobacco pandemic. Although member states will ultimately decide about their
commitment to tobacco control, active promotion of tobacco control standards
through an international regulatory strategy is an important step toward the
protection of global public health.
On May 26, 1996, after this Article went to press, the World Health Assembly adopted a
resolution calling upon the Director-General of WHO:
(7) to initiate the development of a framework convention in accordance with
Article 19 of the WHO Constitution;
(ii) to include as part of this framework convention a strategy to encourage
member nations to move progressively towards the adoption of comprehensive
tobacco control policies, and also to deal with aspects of tobacco control that
transcend national boundaries. .. ."
263. International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 49.17, 49th Ass., 6th
Plen. mtg., WHO Doc. A49/VR16 (1996). See generally, Allyn L. Taylor & Ruth Roemer, International
Strategy for Tobacco Control, WHO Doc. WHOIPSAI96.6 (1996).
